Björn Hettne, Fredrik Söderbaum and Patrik Stålgren

The EU as a Global Actor in the South
Björn Hettne, Fredrik Söderbaum
and Patrik Stålgren

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in the South

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PREFACE

This report draws on the experiences of a recently concluded research project funded by the Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS). The project originally set in 2003 with the intention of analysing the internal dynamics of the EU in terms of policy coordination between EU institutions and the Member States in the field of development cooperation in Africa. However, the project researchers soon realised that the internal dimensions of the EU were closely interwoven with its role in the world. They also realised that to obtain robust answers on “global development” they were forced to go beyond development cooperation as such and transcend Africa as the single regional counterpart. This resulted in a more comprehensive comparative report, which seeks to understand variations in the EU’s role as a global actor in global development and across different counterpart regions in the South (Africa, Asia and Latin America). The enormous growth of literature in this field during the past few years shows the great relevance of the subject. This report aims at a general overview of the literature meant for the general public and policy makers, particularly in Sweden. Its core contribution is the analysis and empirical illustration of what is termed regional actorship and interregionalism.

The project has resulted in a series of more specialized publications, which this report draws upon, and in which more detailed references can be found:

• Fredrik Söderbaum and Patrik Stålgren (eds.), *EU and the Global South* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008);

• Fredrik Söderbaum and Luk van Langenhove (eds.), *The EU as a Global Player: The Politics of Interregionalism* (Routledge, 2006), originally published as a special issue of *Journal of European Integration*, vol. 27, no. 3 (2005);

• Björn Hettne, Interregionalism and World Order: The Diverging EU and US Models, in Mario Telo (ed.), *European Union and New Regionalism. Regional actors and global governance in a post-hegemonic era* (Ashgate, 2nd edition 2007);


• Björn Hettne and Fredrik Söderbaum, The UN and Regional Organizations in Global Security: Competing or Complementary Logics?, *Global Governance*, vol. 12, no. 3 (2006), pp. 227–232;
Fredrik Söderbaum, Regionalism in Africa and EU-African Interregionalism, in Mario Telo (ed.), *European Union and New Regionalism. Regional actors and global governance in a post-hegemonic era* (Ashgate, 2nd edition, 2007);

Fredrik Söderbaum and Patrik Stålgren, The European Union as a Global Actor in the South, in Per Cramér (ed.), *European Studies at University of Gothenburg* (Centre for European Research, University of Gothenburg, 2007);

Fredrik Söderbaum, Comparative Regionalism, in Todd Landman and Neil Robinson (eds.), *SAGE Handbook of Comparative Politics* (Sage Books, forthcoming);


SIEPS conducts and promotes research and analysis of European policy issues within the disciplines of political science, law and economics. SIEPS strives to act as a link between the academic world and policymakers at various levels.

Jörgen Hettne
Acting Director, SIEPS
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Fredrik Söderbaum is Associate Professor of Peace and Development Research at the School of Global Studies, University of Gothenburg and Senior Associate Research Fellow at the United Nations University-Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS), Bruges, Belgium. Recent books include EU and the Global South (co-edited with Patrik Stålgren, Lynne Rienner, 2008), Afro-regions. The Dynamics of Cross-Border Regionalism in Africa (co-edited with Ian Taylor, Nordic Africa Institute, 2008), The EU as a Global Player: The Politics of Interregionalism (co-edited with Luk van Langenhove, Routledge, 2006), The Political Economy of Regionalism: The Case of Southern Africa (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), and Theories of New Regionalism (co-edited with Tim Shaw, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

Patrik Stålgren is a researcher at the Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg. His publications focus primarily on African politics, international environmental regimes, and on international development cooperation. He is the co-editor of EU and the Global South (Lynne Rienner, 2008).
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<thead>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean and the Pacific group of countries</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<td>ASEM</td>
<td>Asia-Europe Meeting</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>CAP</td>
<td>Common Agricultural Policy</td>
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<td>CCP</td>
<td>Common Commercial Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMEA</td>
<td>Council for Mutual Economic Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAEC</td>
<td>East Asia Economic Caucus</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
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<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>EFPC</td>
<td>EU Foreign Policy Complex</td>
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<td>EFPR</td>
<td>EU Foreign Policy Relation</td>
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<td>EFTA</td>
<td>European Free Trade Association</td>
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<td>EMIFCA</td>
<td>EU-Mercosur Interregional Framework Co-operation Agreement</td>
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<td>EMP</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMU</td>
<td>Economic and Monetary Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPA</td>
<td>Economic Partnership Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLR</td>
<td>Great Lakes region</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDC</td>
<td>Less Developed Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mercosur</td>
<td>Southern Common Market</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>SGP</td>
<td>European Stability and Growth Pact</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report, drawing on a recently concluded research project, analyses the EU’s ambitions and experiences in becoming a unified global actor with special reference to the field of global development and with particular focus on Africa, Asia and Latin America. This objective is seen against the background of the historical formation of Europe as a region, and the particular preconditions for regional agency.

Regional agency is a new and underresearched phenomenon, which has come to life due to the transformation of the EU from being mainly an instrument for economic cooperation to being a political actor trying to shape external conditions. The need for regional agency emanates from the challenges of globalisation as most states are too weak to manage these problems on their own. However, the ability must be created from within, through innovative institution building. The question is what the preconditions for this ability might be.

The study develops a theoretical framework based on the concept of *regional actorship*, which includes subjective, institutional and historical dimensions in order to give a comprehensive view on regional agency as distinct from state action. A multidimensional approach to the study of regionally based actorship is built around three interacting components: internal *regionness*, external *presence* and organised *actorness*.

The concept of regional actorship is not specifically related to the EU as a global actor but is meant to serve as an analytical framework in studying the transformation of any region from object to subject, that is with a certain actor capacity in its external relations. For two regions to establish a functioning interregional relationship it is essential that both regions have achieved a certain degree of actorship.

Regional agency is vastly different from national agency, but much more effective to the extent that it actually works. The study tries to see the current problems in the light of history in order to pinpoint not only what kind of reforms are necessary, but also their degree of realism in view of the EU’s complex foreign policy machinery, which is a historically emerging rather than consciously designed structure. It describes the intricate machinery through which actorship is being institutionalised, what is here referred to as the EU Foreign Policy Complex and how this complex operates in its various EU Foreign Policy Relations in trying to achieve consistency and coherence.

Regarding the problem of consistency, the report highlights that in some ways the EU stands out as dysfunctional as a coordination mechanism, and
that the European Commission’s activities in the field of global development so far can be regarded as “just another EU Member State”. With regard to coherence, the study explores the links between trade, development and security, and the challenges this leads to for EU actoriness in the world and the three southern regions in particular.

The policy field under consideration, “global development”, is also complex. The notion of global development, strongly promoted by Sweden, signifies the overall objective of development in the present globalised condition, in which many policy issues interrelate, such as trade and economic cooperation, international development cooperation, security and conflict management, and the environment (including climate change). Here the EU faces difficult challenges as a global actor, but it is only fair to mention that the EU is the only major actor seriously concerned with these issues as a policy package, which implies a particular global responsibility and a particular “civilian” power to influence. The report concentrates on the first three mentioned foreign policy issue areas, since the EU’s important role in climate policy so far mainly has addressed other industrialised countries.

The main argument pursued here is that global development implies a coherent, consistent and well-coordinated policy package, which according to our findings should preferably be based on a solid programme of regionalism and interregionalism. The current world order is fragile and unstable, which makes it very difficult to implement a policy of global development towards a just and sustainable world order. Only the EU is potentially capable of providing leadership in creating such a world order, namely a global multilateral platform of committed actors. The importance of interregionalism lies in its potential for such a world order. This in turn necessitates a strong commitment from all Member States, such as Sweden.

The report concludes by summarising the main points and goes on to tackle the question what the EU Member States, in particular Sweden, can do to improve the EU as a global actor in the field of global development, under the assumption that there is an added value in the EU’s policies compared to those of individual Member States.

The policy conclusions emphasised for promoting the EU as a global actor in global development are based on two considerations: the comparative advantage of regionalism and interregionalism, and the need to improve the relationship between regionalism and other levels of governance, especially multilateralism.
Regionalism has a comparative advantage compared to the multilateral trading system for at least two main reasons: first, regionalism can go beyond narrow trade liberalisation and “barrier-dropping”, and second, regionalism can provide a link between trade integration and other economic and non-economic sectors. Regions may also be good vehicles for smaller countries to increase their bargaining power and voice in multilateral trade. The most pragmatic and effective solution is a “regional multilateralism”, whereby multilateralism is rebuilt on the foundations of regionalism.

It must be emphasised that trade regionalism needs to be integrated in an interlevel approach, where regional and multilateral trading arrangements in particular are complementary rather than competing as often tends to be the case today. This also involves interregionalism. Hence: the EU should reconcile multilateral, interregional and regional integration arrangements. Sweden has a role to play in such a process through its commitment to multilateral principles, including regional multilateralism.

The “European Consensus on Development” is based on the need for a common European development policy. Three components are particularly important: the added value of the EU, consistency and coherence. The potential added value of the EU is not being realised. Most importantly, this added value would be a comprehensive international development policy in which problems of unequal trade, poverty, environmental degradation, conflicts and migration are understood in a holistic way.

There are severe coordination problems of EU development cooperation. Often the European Commission is not functioning as a coordination mechanism within the EU, and it can be understood as “just another donor”. Although politicians and policymakers frequently emphasise that the EU is the world’s biggest aid player, this can mainly be understood in terms of “presence” rather than a capacity to act or capacity to actively coordinate. In essence, the EU is as yet not a fullfledged global actor.

This report also highlights fundamental questions related to coherence. Often it seems that aid is aligned with trade and foreign policy objectives rather than vice versa, as exemplified by the Economic Partnership Agreements and the Common Agricultural Policy, and both undermine global development. Sweden has the capacity to act as a role model through its Policy for Global Development. Sweden can also be a role model and promoter of ensuring emphasis on poverty reduction rather than other objectives which may be more instrumental for the interests of individual Member States. Furthermore, Sweden with a good record in multilateral
operations should use its influence to minimize possible contradictions between multilateral and regional approaches.

There are many reasons why a region-centred approach might be more relevant than a UN-led approach in the emerging global security context. For instance, the regional spillovers and regionalisation of many so-called domestic conflicts require regional solutions, which is evident in a case such as the Great Lakes region. In many cases, regions are better able to deal with their own conflicts than a distant and sometimes paralysed UN. Moreover, regional organisations are often better at addressing conflict prevention as well as post-conflict reconstruction.

The report argues for some kind of horizontal and more balanced combination of regional and multilateral agencies, each having its own basis of authority, as the predominant future form of global security governance. Both the UN and regional bodies need each other and must assume shared responsibility for resolving security problems. For its part, the UN has suffered a decline in power and authority and therefore needs support from regional bodies. Meanwhile many regional formations (particularly in Africa) are still embryonic and need support from global arrangements. A combined multilateral regional strategy provides the most feasible solution for the midterm future.

Sweden has by now gained experience from all the phases of the conflict circle and should be able to take the lead in developing a broad regional strategy for conflict management in line with the global development policy, and combining multilateral and regional instruments within an EU framework.
1 INTRODUCTION

Differing views abound about what type of political animal the EU is and about the nature and impact of its external relations. In the last few years the literature about Europe as a global actor has grown enormously. Although the EU is, to an increasing extent, referred to as one of the two superpowers of the world, it is not a “state”, but what here is called a “regional institutionalised polity”. Sceptics argue that the EU has diffuse and ineffective foreign policies, and that it is divided between the interests of its Member States, implying that the EU is seen merely as a potential actor in world politics. Also more positive observers have varying views about the EU as a global and international actor, and the logic behind its external relations. In short, the EU is often perceived as an ambiguous polity and its foreign policy profile appears to be a moving target.

This report, based on a larger research programme initiated in 2003, analyses the EU’s ambitions and experiences in becoming a unified global actor with special reference to the field of global development and with particular focus on Africa, Asia and Latin America. This objective is seen against the background of the historical formation of Europe as a region, and the particular preconditions for what is called “regional actorship”. The study develops a theoretical framework based on the concept of actorship, which includes subjective, institutional, historical and structural dimensions in order to give a comprehensive view on regional agency as distinct from state action. A multidimensional approach to the study of regionally based actorship is built around three interacting components: internal regionness, external presence and organised, purposive actorness.

The concept of actorship is not specifically related to the EU as a global actor but is meant to serve as a comparative analytical framework in studying the transformation of any region from object to subject, that is with a certain actor capacity in its external relations. Regional actorship is central for understanding the quality of interregional relations, that is, organised, institutional arrangements between two regions. For two regions to establish a functioning interregional relationship it is essential that both regions have achieved a certain degree of actorship. This study will look into the links between the EU on one side and Africa, Latin America and Asia on the other, but no comparative analysis of regional actorship has been done here.

Regional agency is a new and underresearched phenomenon, which has come to life due to the transformation of the EU from being mainly an instrument for economic cooperation to being a political actor with broadly
defined objectives trying to shape external conditions. In order to gain legitimacy as a global actor, in Member States and the international community, the EU must acquire actorship. Actorship brings attention to the close relationship between the EU’s internal development and its external policies. This link is evident in the EU’s official policy documents and treaties, which repeatedly stress that without a unified, coherent, consistent and coordinated external policy the legitimacy of the EU as a global actor will be called into question.

Regional agency is vastly different from national agency, but much more effective to the extent that it actually works. This is the main concern of this report. The study tries to see the current problems in the light of history in order to pinpoint not only what kind of reforms are necessary, but also their degree of realism in view of the EU’s complex foreign policy machinery, which is a historically emerging rather than consciously designed structure. This study deals with this complex foreign policy machinery and how it operates in different foreign policy relations: with new candidates, with the “near abroad”, with the great powers, and further afield with the regions of Africa, Latin America and Asia.

This report analyses the EU’s ambitions and experiences as a global actor with special reference to the field of “global development”. The notion of “global development” signifies the overall objective of development in the present globalised condition, in which many policy issues interrelate, such as trade and economic cooperation, international development cooperation, poverty reduction, security and conflict management, and the environment. Here the EU faces difficult challenges as a global actor, but it is only fair to mention that the EU is seriously concerned about these issues as a policy package, implying a particular global responsibility and perhaps a power to influence. Sweden could also play an important part in this area as one of the Member States that has taken “global development” as an overarching objective in international development cooperation and foreign policy.

The report is structured as follows: In the next section it is argued that the need for regional agency emanates from the challenges of globalisation as most states are too weak to manage these problems on their own. As a theoretical framework for the ability of a regional polity to influence the external world we use regional actorship, a concept built around three interacting components. The third section describes the historical development of Europe as a regional actor, focusing on both identity formation and the worldwide role of the EU. In the fourth section, we describe the EU’s Foreign Policy Complex (EFPC), which is seen as the intricate institutional machinery through which actorship is being realized, and how it is
implemented in the EU’s various foreign policy relations (EFPRs). The fifth section deals with the objectives and describes the various components and the comprehensiveness of global development in order to highlight the problems of coherence and consistency. The sixth section provides a comparative analysis of the EU as a global actor in the three aforementioned developing regions (Africa, Latin America and Asia) with regard to three major issue areas in global development (trade/economic cooperation, international development cooperation, and security). The report concludes by highlighting the main points and the question what individual EU member countries (Sweden in particular) can do for improving the EU’s coherence, consistency and coordination in global development.
2 AN ANATOMY OF REGIONAL ACTORSHIP

The concept of regional actorship is meant to include subjective, institutional, historical and structural dimensions in order to give a comprehensive view on regional agency as distinct from state action. The preconditions for actorship must be looked for both in internal developments within the region and in its external context. The relative cohesion of the regional actor shapes external action, which in turn impacts on regional identity and consciousness through the expectations and reactions of external actors vis-à-vis the region.

A multidimensional approach to the study of regionally based actorship is built around three interacting components:
(1) regionness: internal (objective) integration and (subjective) identity-formation;
(2) international presence: in terms of size, economic strength, military power etcetera; and
(3) actorness: the capacity to act purposively to shape outcomes in the external world.

2.1 Regionness

External action thus depends on internal cohesiveness, which includes identity as an important but hard-to-define component. Identity is what brings people together to form a “we”. If there is a consolidated internal actor identity, some sort of external actorship should also follow. The impact depends on the strength of regionness, presence and actorness in various policy areas and in relation to various counterparts. The question is to what extent the EU’s strong international presence is actually transformed into a purposive capacity to shape the external environment by influencing other actors and ultimately the world order. This potential depends upon our definition of a region. Normally a region is not associated with actorship but rather is seen as an “arena” or “level” of action. Not so here. Here regions are understood as processes; they are not geographical or administrative objects but potential subjects, and thereby actors in the making.

Regionalism is usually seen as the ideology and project of region-building, while the concept of regionalisation is reserved for more spontaneous processes of region formation by different actors – state or non-state. When different processes of regionalisation intensify and converge within the same geographical area, the cohesion and thereby the distinctiveness of the region in the making increases. A regional actor takes shape. This
process of regionalisation can be described in terms of levels of *regionness* (Hettne 1993, 2003; Hettne and Söderbaum 2000). The concept of regionness defines the position of a particular region in terms of its cohesion. The levels of regionness refer to different historical contexts of varying cohesion, not to a single variable. However the choice of concept signifying the particular levels is mostly inspired by security theory and the categorisation of security arrangements.

In general and abstract terms one can speak of five levels of regionness:

1. Regional social space;
2. Regional social system;
3. Regional international society;
4. Regional community; and
5. Regional institutionalised polity.

*Regional social space* is a geographic area, delimited generally by natural, physical barriers and populated by largely non-related local groups of people. The region is thus objectively rooted in territory; in social terms the region is organised by human inhabitants, at first in relatively isolated communities, and later constituting some kind of translocal relationship which can result from demographic change or changes in transport technology. The regional space is ultimately filled up with a growing population.

This increased density of contacts, implying more durable relations, is what creates a *regional social system*. This precarious security situation, characterised by competing political units, has in history often led to an empire, or even more often to pendulum movements between a centralised and a more or less decentralised order. The point is that the centralised system achieves order by being coercive, which is different from today’s voluntary regionalism emerging from decentralised state systems.

The region as an *international society* implies a set of rules that makes interstate relations less anarchic, more enduring and predictable, and thus more peaceful, or at least less violent. It can be either organised (*de jure*) or more spontaneous (*de facto*). In the case of a more institutionalised cooperation, the region is constituted by the members of the regional organisation.

The region as a *community* takes shape when an enduring organisational framework (formal or less formal) facilitates and promotes social commu-
nication and the convergence of values, norms and behaviour throughout the region, which implies identity formation at the regional level. Thus a transnational civil society emerges, characterised by social trust at this level.

Finally, region as an institutionalised polity has a more fixed and permanent structure of decision-making and therefore stronger acting capability or actorship. Such a regional polity does not have to be characterised by the normal terminology used to describe political systems but can be sui generis, as in the case of Europe, or Europolity. No other region in the world can at present be described in these terms.

The approach of seeing a region as process implies an evolution of deepening regionalism, not necessarily following the idealised, staged model presented above, which mainly serves a heuristic purpose. Since regionalism is a political project, created by human actors, it may move not only in different directions but might indeed also fail, just as a nation-state project as we have seen in too many cases. Seen from this perspective, decline would mean fragmentation and decreasing regionness and dilution of identity.

2.2 Presence
Europe as an external actor is more than the EU’s foreign policy, and more even than the aggregate of the EU’s policies across all areas of its activity. Simply by existing, and due to its relative weight (demographically, economically, militarily and ideologically), the Union has an impact on the rest of the world. Its footprints are seen everywhere. It is the largest donor in the world and the size of its economy is comparable to that of the US. It is also building a military capacity meant to be used outside the region. This provokes reactions and creates expectations from the outside. The concept of presence is often used to signify this phenomenon, constituting the bridge between endogenous and exogenous factors. A stronger presence implies a greater capacity to act, unless we are dealing with a sleeping giant (who must anyhow wake up sooner or later). The actor must be subjectively conscious about its presence and prepared to make use of it in order to achieve actoriness. In the “near abroad” presence is particularly strong, and can develop into the outright absorption of new territory (enlargement). To the extent that an enlarged region can retain the same level of actoriness, its presence will increase because of its sheer size. The original European Economic Community (EEC) had a population of 185 million, compared with today’s number in excess of 450 million. Presence is a complex and comprehensive material variable, depending on the size of the actor, the scope of its external activities, the relative importance of different issue areas, and the relative dependence of various regions upon
the European market. A stronger presence means more repercussions and
decisions and thereby a pressure to act. In the absence of such action, presence itself will diminish.

2.3 Actorness
Actorness implies a scope of action and room for manoeuvre, in some cases even a legal personality, which is however rare in the case of regions. In the EU, actorness is closely related to the controversial issue of competencies (who has the right to decide what?), ultimately determined by the Member States. Actorness suggests a growing capacity to act that follows from the strengthened presence of the regional unit in different contexts, as well as from the actions that follow the interaction between the actor and its external environment. Actorness with reference to the outside world is thus not only a simple function of regionness, but also an outcome of a dialectic process between endogenous and exogenous forces.

Bretherton and Vogler (2006: 30) identify four requirements for actorness with reference to the EU:
(1) shared commitment to a set of overarching shared values and principles;
(2) domestic legitimation of decision processes, and priorities, relating to external policy;
(3) the ability to identify policy priorities and to formulate consistent and coherent policies; and
(4) the availability of, and capacity to utilize, policy instruments (diplomacy, economic tools and military means).

Obviously, these requirements are fulfilled to different degrees in different EU Foreign Policy Relations and in different foreign policy issue areas: from the “near abroad” to far away regions; and from the areas of trade – in which the EU is a strong actor – to security – where the competence given to the EU is contested and highly controversial. In other words, actorness is shifting over time, between issue areas and between foreign policy relations. This has to do with the peculiar nature of the EU as an actor and the complexity of its foreign policy machinery. The most problematic requirement of actorness appears to be that of domestic legitimation, in view of the democratic deficit of the EU. This is posing a severe challenge to EU actorness particularly in the field of security.

The unique feature of regional actorness is that it must be created by voluntary processes and therefore depends more on dialogue and con-
sensus building than on coercion. This process is the model Europe holds out as the preferred world order, since this is the way the new Europe (as organised by the EU) has developed in its more recent peaceful evolution, in contrast with its historically more violent development. With increased levels of actorness in different fields of action and different parts of the world, Europe will be able to influence the world order towards its own preferred model of civilian power: dialogue, respect for different interests within an interregional, pluralist framework based on democracy, social justice and equality, multilateralism and international law (Telò 2006).

2.4 Regional actorship: a multidimensional, comparative concept

The concept of regional actorship is not specifically related to the EU as a global actor but is meant to serve as an analytical framework in studying the transformation of any region from object to subject, that is with a certain actor capacity in its external relations. For two regions to establish a functioning interregional relationship it is essential that both regions have achieved a certain degree of actorship that is internal cohesion, external presence and organised actorness. The greater the difference in actorship of two interlinked regions the greater the asymmetries. We shall come back to the crucial importance of regional actorship in interregional relations.

Figure 1: Regional actorship.

The policy of interregionalism is pursued energetically by the EU, whereas other regions, even if they are organised as regions, have little say. This situation creates an asymmetrical relationship. Interregionalism can thus be described as a relationship between actors provided with the various com-
ponents of actorship: regionness, presence and actorness. These components can compensate for each other’s weaknesses. A weak presence can for instance be compensated for by stronger internal cohesion or effectively organised actorness. Even the African, Caribbean and the Pacific group of countries (ACP), a “region” completely constructed by the EU, have been able to exercise some leverage in negotiations with the EU. On the other hand a strong presence does not necessarily lead to regional actorship. North America as organised in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) for instance is strong in terms of presence but weak in terms of regionness and actorness. In fact NAFTA cannot be considered a regional actor since it is lacking an external dimension. The Southeast Asia region as organised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and increasingly East Asia organised in ASEAN Plus Three (APT), as well as the Southern Cone of Latin America organised in Mercosur are increasing their actorship. Other regions completely lack actorship, for instance the Mediterranean, which is a construction by the EU Neighbourhood Policy, and Central Asia, which can be described as a “pre-region”.
3 THE SHAPING OF EUROPE AS A REGIONAL ACTOR

The historical perspective applied in this analysis is that the current world order is in transformation from a regional international system, which originated in Europe in the first part of the 17th century and was fully globalised in the 20th century. The time of its birth was a messy period, as one political order was in decay while a new order was about to emerge. The typical pre-modern political order, not only in Europe but also in most parts of the world, was the more or less centralised Empire. However, the immediate pre-Westphalian experience of the Europeans was an extremely decentralised political order called “feudalism” – essentially a collapsed empire. How this came to be a uniquely European world order, with Europe as an actor with a particular identity and a higher level of regionness, is discussed below in terms of the five levels of regionness.

3.1 Regional social space

*Regional social space* is the lowest degree of regionness. In the regional social space that came to be called Europe, empire was a distant memory but also an impelling political ideal, when the continental polity became fragmented and was replaced by micro-units such as tribes, feudatories and emerging small kingdoms. The first European polity that showed some resemblance to classical empire was the territory under the control of Charlemagne in the ninth century – considered by many to be the core of “Europe”. Under the subsequent period of high medievalism, this space became a more consolidated cultural area, based on Latin Christendom as the integrative ideology. Peoples began to share a number of cultural practices, including a common experience (for the elites) of higher education, received from universities established throughout Europe. The pre-Westphalian order was a multilevel system with diffuse and constantly shifting authority structures without clear territorial borders and with no absolute authority. This system was not systematic but rather a bewildering mixture of often incompatible elements: the Christian Church represented by the Pope, an empire project with the purpose of unifying Europe under one emperor, feudal lords ruling over a subjugated peasantry, emerging kings who originated from the major feudal lords and who controlled pieces of territory, long distance trading networks that covered most of Europe and linked it with the outside world, local marketplaces, and an emerging bourgeoisie in semi-independent cities.

3.2 Regional social system

Frustrated attempts were made to transform this decentralised and periodically chaotic (“dark age”) polity into an empire, built on the ideal
of the Roman Empire. After hundreds of years this contradictory structure exploded in the 17th century in an equally contradictory war (a war with many actors operating at different levels of the system and pursuing different goals). Ultimately, a new political order – Westphalia – was born. It resulted in the sovereign, territorial state, which in turn implied the end of local power, as well as of continental, all-European political and economic structures. All power was now monopolised by the state. This also meant that there was no overarching regional or world power, that is, a situation of “anarchy” as it was later termed by political theorists of the so-called realist school. The more successful nation-states competed not only in Europe but took their struggle to other continents. Europe thereby came to rule the world, not as a single actor but through its major nation-states dividing the world among them. The European regional system of states became a world system (Bull and Watson 1984). Governance functions were monopolised by the emerging kingdoms; a sort of compromise (absolutism) between centralisation (imperial order) and decentralisation (feudal order) emerged. There was therefore a certain loss of regionness at the continental level, as the new territorial states became economically introverted (through mercantilism) and later trapped in an assertive ethnic identity (through nationalism).

Through growing internal social and economic relations, Europe had become a regional social system. In security terms this system was mostly violent, but complexity was reduced as “state” became identical with “territory”, and wars became territorial rather than religious (Heffernan 1998: 17). The number of actors was reduced and the modern political map took form. The state-building in Europe was violent, so people gradually learnt to conceive of their “own” state as protector, and the rest of the world as “anarchy”, a threat to their security. Europe was still a dangerous place – a violent regional security complex (Buzan and Waever 2003).

3.3 Regional international society
Throughout European modern history there have been several efforts to create geopolitical hegemony or dominion, provoking “anti-hegemonic” wars. These attempts at continental control have come from the dominant nations. Progress was for military reasons identified with economic development, which in the 19th century meant industrialisation. The state ultimately became responsible for what came to be called “development”, and the nation-state territory became the privileged space – container – in which development was to take place, security to be guaranteed and welfare to be created. The world order was a regional European system, stabilised by what became known as the European Concert. The “anarchy” thereby be-
came a *regional international society* or an “anarchical society” (Bull 1977). The European Concert provided peace in the 19th century, but in spite of economic integration facilitated by “the long peace” the continent was plagued by increasing tensions towards the end of the century and by destructive wars in the first half of the twentieth century. A new Europe had to be built on new foundations.

### 3.4 Regional community

The second half of the 20th century saw the emergence of a *regional community*: the EEC/EU. The “Europeanisation” of Europe is a complex term if it is taken to mean the existence of a model Europe towards which real processes converge. No such master model ever existed. The process is more complex, combining forces from above and from below. Europeanisation implies increasing sameness of the units in a system to the extent that the units experience a shared destiny, without necessarily giving up their individuality. A distinction can be made between regionalisation from below in the larger, “real” region, and harmonisation of the formal organised region, steered from above through a political/bureaucratic system (regionalism). However, the two processes are interlinked so a strict distinction cannot be maintained. It is typically the case in “the community method” that harmonisation attempts are premature, leading to backlashes.

The regionalisation process was constituted by different forms of *convergence* in terms of (i) political regimes, (ii) economic homogenisation, and (iii) in the way security arrangements were organised. *Regime convergence* implies the reduction of differences within a particular political space, in this case an emerging region. The homogenisation of essential features of the political system can be seen as a precondition for joining the EU, and thus as a factor explaining enlargement. Normally a country Europeanises before being adopted as “European” and forming part of the EU, whereby regionalisation from below changes into harmonisation and coordination from above. The recent (post-1957) process of political homogenisation in Europe has gone through three phases: (i) in the south, the disappearance of military dictatorships in the mid-1970s; (ii) in the west, the more widespread self-assertion of the European Atlantic partners in the field of security, beginning in the early 1980s; and (iii) in the east, the fall of the communist regimes in the late 1980s and the Soviet collapse in 1991.

The process of *economic homogenisation*, associated with uniform national adaptations to globalisation, has led to a state of liberal hegemony in Europe, although at the beginning the policy of state interventionism was widespread. The first economic regional institutions in post-war Western
Europe were the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 and the European Community (EC) in 1957. Behind the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1959 was, firstly, the traditional British national interest of avoiding involvement in any supranational European scheme, and, secondly, diverse national security interests of minor states expressed in different forms of neutrality. In Eastern Europe the context for regionalisation was also geopolitically determined. In the case of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) (1949) the national interests involved seem to have reflected the principle of “the less integration, the better”. In fact, most cooperation within the bloc was simply bilateral and the CMEA was a hindrance to – rather than an instrument of – regional integration. A more relaxed security situation signalled its dissolution. Much the same can be said of EFTA, which, as neutrality disappeared from the security agenda, gradually became a “waiting room” for the EU membership candidates.

Security is the third field of convergence and coordination. The two post-war military blocs, albeit with a group of neutrals in between, manifestly expressed Europe’s political subordination to the superpowers. It was an era of hegemonic regionalism, imposed from above and from the outside. From the viewpoint of economic organisation, the security imperative imposed a more or less corresponding cleavage pattern. In periods of détente it became evident that economic contacts tended to follow a logic of their own. In periods of high tension, economic relations, in contrast, had to adapt to the political imperatives built into the security arrangement. All this underlines the predominance of the security factor. In spite of this, the security factor was not expressed in institutional and policy terms until recently. Here, the break-up of Yugoslavia was the major learning process.

3.5 Regional institutionalised polity
Thus far, the EU is, in terms of regionness, the only example of a regional institutionalised polity – at present hovering between intergovernmentalism and supranational governance – but with an uncertain future, due to a new wave of euroscepticism and the decreased coherence and consistency following the inflow of new members. The main controversies have been in the fields of economic policy and security. As the EU started to become an institutionalised polity in the 1990s the economic foundation became more liberal than earlier due to domestic political changes in the Member States. The economic regionalisation of Europe arising out of the intensification of the internal market project has thus so far been fully consistent with market-led economic globalisation. Indeed both processes have been founded on the same neo-liberal paradigm. The economic convergences
contributing to increasing regionness occurred in a context of liberalisation, deregulation and orthodox anti-inflationary policies, which were built into the constitutional future of Europe, as spelled out in the Maastricht Treaty (1991).

In the subsequent years the European Monetary Union (EMU) became the main route to integration. The convergence criteria of the EMU illustrate a process of regionalisation (or regionalism) directed from above (harmonisation) and in accordance with a strict schedule, although occasionally and selectively generous in its application due to public resistance to financial orthodoxy. Clearly, it is difficult to distinguish the politics from the economics of monetary integration. More recently the problems of the European Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) underlined the dangers of political divergence within a monetary bloc, raising doubts about the viability of the EMU. With a single currency, fiscal indiscipline in one state clearly has implications for others. We may, however, also face a more complicated situation in which there is genuine disagreement about the correct economic policy. Regime convergence has preceded the formal integration process, since only democratic, market-oriented polities can merge with the European polity. The adaptation to a political order, compatible with European values, has been – and to some extent continues to be – a major source of change in Greater Europe. This process is far from finished. Former “Eastern Europe” has been successfully integrated on the basis of liberalism, but in the Balkans the EU has faced a major security crisis with the current problems in Kosovo constituting the last phase.

The fundamental problem is that the EU institutions were originally designed around a limited number of countries, in a different age and with a different purpose. The European project grew out of a Cold War context and a transatlantic alliance, and was intended to create a coherent and homogeneous capitalist core out of the competing great powers of Europe. The process of deepening (institution-building) is now lagging far behind enlargement, threatening all dimensions of actorship and ultimately dependent on how “Europe” is subjectively conceived by its inhabitants, who increasingly are attracted by the politics of identity.
4 THE QUALITY OF ACTORSHIP

A number of convergences create a more coherent basis for external action, but by themselves they do not constitute effective actorship. A supranational structure of some sort is necessary in order to avoid divisions and inconsistencies among member countries. Furthermore, the various institutions must constitute a consistent and coherent framework rather than just adding one institution to another in an ad hoc manner. Europe, as organised by the EU, is certainly the most institutionalised regional actor of all, but its institutions do not form one consistent whole but rather a patchwork. This chapter describes the intricate machinery through which actorness, or the will to exercise influence in the external world, is being institutionalised, what is here referred to as the EU Foreign Policy Complex (EFPC) and how this complex operates in its various EU Foreign Policy Relations (EFPRs) in trying to achieve consistency and coherence.

4.1 The EU’s Foreign Policy Complex

The foreign policy machinery of the EU is historically emerging rather than consciously designed. Therefore it may be more appropriate to refer to it as the EU’s Foreign Policy Complex. Since two previous SIEPS reports (2008:6-7) in an admirable way have clarified this complex we prefer to be rather brief here.

The complexity of the EFPC derives from many factors:
(1) two political levels (the individual nation-states and the EU level);
(2) the pillar system, and the different competencies with regard to where decisions are taken;
(3) the multiplicity of common institutions and policy instruments; and
(4) the multiplicity of foreign policy objectives.

Firstly, there are at least two political levels: the level of the individual nation-states (which means 27 foreign ministries), insisting on their right to pursue their own foreign policies; and the Union level, divided between the Community – where the Commission is the driver – and the Council where the governments of the Member States can take collective decisions if they so wish. Thus the Council also reflects the interests of the Member States, but, to the extent that qualified majority voting takes place and there is mobilisation behind important concerns, it will in practice constitute a level of its own above the Member States. Much theorising is devoted to the nature of these levels and their interrelations in different policy areas.
Secondly, the EFPC contains three distinct policy clusters characterised by different responsibilities with regard to where decisions are taken – the so-called “pillars” of trade and economic cooperation, security and defence, and justice and home affairs. Through their external implications (presence) each is important for the EU as a global actor. The Treaty of Rome in 1957 was above all concerned with the international trade regime, and also provided for a customs union, which was subsequently established in 1968. This first pillar made the EC a global actor in trade negotiations, with presence and actoriness mutually supporting each other. The second pillar is understood to encompass cooperation among the Member States in the foreign policy and security fields. It is mildly paradoxical that this cooperation is extremely sensitive and controversial, at the same time as the entire integration project is officially described as a historical peace project. Thus, security is described as the core of the EU project, but it seems instead to be an indirect effect of cooperation, which should not be seen in explicitly direct terms. The third pillar – cooperation in justice and home affairs – commenced in the 1970s, during a period of heightened terrorism throughout Europe. Due to sensitivities about national security this cooperation took place discreetly, without formal binding agreements (Smith 2003: 31, 47ff). On the other hand, the increased seriousness of the issue imposed itself on the Member States. The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 gave this cryptic area the high-sounding name of “area of freedom, security and justice”, fulfilling the promise of bringing the EU “closer to the citizens”. In spite of this promise the Amsterdam Treaty moved many items to the first (supranational) pillar, creating a contradiction between effectiveness and legitimacy. Thus, this is an area of cross-pillar operation. In fact a large number of issues would be more effectively handled by more such cross-pillar operation, or a complete abolishment of the pillar approach – which was in fact a key purpose of the proposed EU constitution. Its failure has been a fundamental setback for the pursuit of coherence and consistency, affecting the various components of actorship. The Lisbon Treaty will not solve this problem.

As a third component of the EFPC, there are several institutions with different mandates and sometimes differing views: the European Council, the Council (different constellations of national ministers), the Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice. The proceedings in the European Parliament sometimes reflects “European” interests, sometimes, since there are parties critical of the European project, rather parochial nationalist interests. Numerous special agencies and policy instruments are operating in various issue areas, depending on which pillar is activated. Most effective instruments are located within the first pillar,
where EU presence is strongly manifested, but need to be applied in the second and third pillars in order to give them more strength. To do so is often complicated because of the bureaucratic cultures and diverging interests that have developed in different institutions, creating what is called bureaucratic politics.

Fourth, various objectives, a mixture of interests and norms, are pursued within the EFPC; for instance regional cooperation, human rights, democracy and good governance, conflict prevention, sustainable development, security and fighting international crime (Smith 2003). Ultimately, the greater objective of the EFPC is multilateral global governance and a regionalised world order, but this is only achievable to the extent that the objectives form a consistent whole.

All these objectives are thus subject to the criteria of *coherence* and *consistency*. Coordination to satisfy these criteria takes place both vertically (between Member States and the Union), and horizontally between the Member States (consistency) and between the pillars and prioritised objectives (coherence). The consistency/coherence imperative drives the EFPC towards more effective coordination, which to some extent implies supranational centralisation. Thus with time the EFPC may lose some of its complexity. The ratification of the Lisbon Treaty would mean a step forward but not solve all problems. However, it should be recognised that the EFPC itself changes over time, as do different issue areas and the EU’s Foreign Policy Relations (EFPRs), due to a number of endogenous and exogenous factors: organisational changes, a growing number of members with shifting interests and norms (endogenous factors), and responses to external expectations and challenges (exogenous factors). It should also be kept in mind that the institutional development towards greater coherence and consistency of the EU takes place in the context of crises and challenges, such as the Balkan crisis, affecting the security area with links to economic cooperation, and the current Burma crisis, strengthening the links between humanitarian aid and human rights in the field of global development.

**4.2 The EU’s Foreign Policy Relations**

The EU’s foreign policy relations (EFPRs) take four main forms: *enlargement* (towards the core area of Europe), *stabilisation* (in “the neighbourhood”), *bilateralism* (towards great and strong powers), and *interregionalism* (towards world regions and regional organisations). Interregionalism (of course apart from enlargement) is the most typically “European” way of relating to the outside world. The four relationships are partly explained
by the principle of distance, which in turn leads to four types of counterparts: prospective members, neighbours, great powers, and more far away regions, such as Africa, Asia and Latin America. Obviously the borderlines between these categories are uncertain and subject to change (basically a political process). Equally obvious is the difficulty for any actor in dealing with all these relations, making up the rest of the world, in a serious way. This report is primarily concerned with the interregional relations between EU and the South, and to a lesser extent bilateralism.

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<th>The EU’s foreign policy relations (EFPRs) take four main forms:</th>
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<td>(1) Enlargement towards prospective members;</td>
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<td>(2) Stabilisation towards neighbours;</td>
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<td>(3) Bilateralism towards great and strong powers; and</td>
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<td>(4) Interregionalism towards other regions and regional organisations.</td>
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**Enlargement policy** covers acceding countries (Bulgaria and Romania were the latest to join), candidate countries (Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Turkey) and potential candidate countries (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia). The enlargements have concerned either well-integrated European countries, whose entries were, for various reasons, delayed, or less developed and politically turbulent countries, integrated into the European mainstream mainly for security reasons.

**The European Neighbourhood Policy** (ENP), with the aim of stabilising the EU’s neighbourhood, offers a privileged relationship with the EU’s neighbours. A crucial component of the ENP is its commitment to promote democratisation and human rights in combination with the principles of good governance, rule of law, market economy and sustainable development. There are no obvious criteria indicating what is to be regarded as non-Europe, other than geographical distance, which also tends to become relative. The boundary is ultimately politically determined. “Eastern Europe” was thus formerly a political concept and is now simply considered as central Europe. In the post-Soviet area – the European part (except the Baltic sub-region that is now part of the EU), the Caucasus and Central Asia – the EU’s presence is weak, and there is little leverage for influence (Dannreuther 2004). The neighbourhood area coincides to a large degree with Russia’s Near Abroad. Russia has claimed the role as stabiliser in this area but lacks a coherent security policy, except for the simple policy of control, with some neo-imperialist overtones, strengthened by the anti-terrorist objective. The Barcelona process is a strategy of cooperation
between the EU and its Mediterranean neighbours, where peace is the first priority, in accordance with the basic concern for stability. The Mediterranean “region” does not exist in a formal sense, but is rather a pure social construction shaped by the EU’s own security concerns.

The EU has developed a series of bilateral relationships with United States, Russia, Canada, Mexico, China, Japan, India and South Africa. In some cases this complements, and in other cases replaces, genuine region-to-region links. The US is the most powerful among the bilateral partners. In fact, the challenges and problems posed by its military superiority cannot be balanced, and its imperial policy cannot be influenced, according to the old realist recipe of the balance of power politics. What remains is what has been called “soft balancing”, which can be seen as a form of civil power, implying different kinds of non-violent resistance. This policy was practised by both small and large powers in connection with the Iraq war and may increase in importance if the USA maintains its commitment to unilateral policies. In spite of a tremendous degree of contact on the level of civil society, the formal interregional transatlantic links (EU–NAFTA) are institutionally weak or non-existent (Aggarwal and Fogarty 2006). The relations between the EU and Russia are similar to those between the EU and the USA, in the sense that Russia also prefers bilateralism, and takes a realist, power-oriented approach.

During the last decade, interregional cooperation in a more institutionalised form has become an increasingly important component of the EU’s FPRs. However, it is a perception strongly linked to the European Commission and barely exists at the level of the Member States that stick to their own foreign policies. The regionalist policy is realised through a large number of interregional arrangements, particularly those with far away counterparts in Africa, Asia and Latin America, where EU interests often clash with those of the US. That the EU constitutes the hub of these interregional arrangements is in full accordance with its regionalist ideology, encompassing not only trade and foreign investment but also political dialogue and cultural relations between the regions. The EU’s ambition is also to formalise the relations as being between regional bodies and regions (“pure” interregionalism) rather than the more diffuse informal, transregional or bilateral contacts. However, for pragmatic reasons, interregional relations take on a bewildering variety of forms. In the cases of Japan and China (and to some extent Brazil), EU bilateral relations complement the interregional relations (ASEM and Mercosur). Interregionalism thus forms a part of the EU’s foreign policy, The EU also organises intercontinental summits such as the EU-Africa summit process and the
EU-Latin American summits. These are highly rhetorical with little substance. ASEM, the Asia-Europe meeting, is more institutionalised. We could see them as general transregional relations, which may become more institutionalised with time and thus take on a more formal interregional form.

There is no reason why the various transregional and interregional relations among different actors, constituting an emerging structure of global governance, should take a single form. There is no single actor strategy, but many unintended outcomes of different policies in different issue areas and in different policy relations. The conceptualisation of interregionalism as more or less “pure” suggest that there are normal and abnormal situations. It is the variety of arrangements that will characterise global governance – not the predominance of one type, such as formal or “pure” interregionalism. The concentration of interregional relations to the Triad is natural in view of the thickness of economic as well as other relations. This does not imply that there is no need for interregional cooperation in other regional contexts. Rather there has until now been a weaker development of such needs and the ability to deal with them. This is an important field for global development assistance since strong regions with effective interregional relations constitute an adequate structure of global governance in the context of growing global challenges. As was stressed above, functioning interregional relations presuppose a certain level of actorship on both sides. Current interregional structures however leave much to be desired. They are asymmetrical and hampered by the competition between the US and Europe, which will be further discussed below.
5 THE OBJECTIVES OF ACTORSHIP: GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT

At the time of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the process of decolonisation was still ongoing, and it was, above all, the colonial relations of France that constituted the origin of the EU’s development policy. In 1963, when most of Africa had become independent, reciprocal preferential trade access between EEC Member States and associated states (former colonies) was established through the Yaoundé Convention, which also formed the European Development Fund (EDF). The arrangements continued in the Lomé system, first established in 1976. This complex post-colonial structure and legacy became a worldwide network of interstate relations, continuously in transformation due to changes in the size of the EU, the number of developing countries in the network, the changing global political economy and shifts in the dominant economic ideology (or development paradigm).

During the 1980s and into the 1990s, development became, in accordance with the Washington Consensus, more or less synonymous with globalisation. However, after increasing social turbulence, collapsing states and “new wars’ in the second half of the 1990s, came the realisation that the global poverty problem would not be solved by itself, and with the shocking news of immediate climate change, the understanding of development became more complex once again. At the start of the new millennium the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were announced at a major UN conference. Development became a demanding policy area referred to as “sustainable development” or “global development”. Sustainable Development was defined by the Brundtland Commission as development that “meets the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987). This definition is more about inter-generational justice than about what sort of development is desirable, and to the ecological dimension have been added economic, social and political dimensions as well as an emphasis on cultural diversity, which make the concept more comprehensive. For a comprehensive analysis, interdisciplinary approaches are necessary. Since nobody wants unsustainable development the concept of development will do. Nevertheless, the concept of sustainable development continues to be in use, not least in the EU’s development thinking. Sustainable development was introduced as a central goal in the Amsterdam Treaty and a strategy was proposed by the Swedish Presidency (at the June 2001 Summit). The strategy (2005–2010) was reviewed and confirmed in 2005. “Sustainable development offers the
European Union a positive long-term vision of a society that is more prosperous and more just, and which promises a cleaner, safer, healthier environment – a society which delivers a better quality of life for us, for our children, and for our grandchildren” (European Commission 2001a: 2). The security situation was mentioned as one reason for the review of the strategy, since new security threats, such as terrorism, natural disasters and health scares had led to a heightened sense of vulnerability.

In this report we have excluded the problem of climate change since the EU’s policy on this issue so far has been directed mainly towards industrialised countries. According to the EU, climate change is certainly a development problem since its adverse effects will disproportionately affect poorer countries with economies predominantly based on natural resources and related economic sectors. Developing countries are likely to suffer the greatest consequences, despite having so far contributed the least to the problem.

Global development can in its most general sense be defined as an improvement in the quality of international relations, which traditionally are described as “anarchic”. Global development implies that standards applied in most domestic systems are taken as norms in the international system as well. Global Development (a central concept in the UN as well as in Swedish development policy) or Sustainable Development (which seems to be the preferred concept in the EU’s development policy) constitutes a comprehensive policy field containing a number of more concrete policies: trade and economic cooperation, international development cooperation, foreign and security policy, and environmental policy.

Below we shall deal with three specific components of the EU’s policy of global development – trade and economic cooperation, international development cooperation, and security and conflict management – which are often seen as a policy triangle (Rosamond 2000). Trade and economic cooperation belongs to the first pillar of supranational responsibility and constituted the rationale for the formation of the EEC. From its origins international development cooperation was also a supranational issue, but became multipillared (shared competence) as new members were integrated, and the development challenge became more dispersed. In contrast security and conflict management has remained a closely guarded intergovernmental policy area within the second pillar, but it is also in many respects linked to the third pillar. We will show that the components are in practice managed as fairly autonomous areas of policymaking and that they are far from being one coherent policy field.
Our analysis of the EU’s policy of global development focuses on:
(1) Trade and economic cooperation;
(2) International development cooperation; and
(3) Security and conflict management.

5.1 Trade and economic cooperation
The EU is a giant in the field of trade, a fact that has a major impact on global development. Already in 1966 the EC emerged as a significant actor in global trade, and the most effective proponent of trade by becoming a customs union. This shows the importance in terms of actorness of a common instrument of external policy – a Europe speaking with one voice. This is certainly the case as far as goods are concerned, but the competence of the Commission has been questioned in some other types of issues linked to trade (such as services, investment and intellectual property rights).

The customs union’s primary remit was of course to stimulate intra-community trade. This it did, although it is difficult to assess how effective it was, as more countries became members, and external trade became redefined as internal trade. The entry of the UK was in this context of course particularly important. The significance, over time, of the EU in global trade has equalled that of the US (at present 20 per cent of world trade in volume of goods). This of course gives the EU international presence, measured by international dependence on the EU market. To this presence should be added financial flows, direct investment and various kinds of economic and technical cooperation. The worldwide presence, of particular importance in the South, is exploited by the European Commission through its exclusive jurisdiction over trade relations and negotiations. There is thus no EU “trade council” composed of national trade ministers. Nor has the European Parliament any (formal) role in the Common Commercial Policy (CCP). The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) rests on very different (protectionist) principles, swallowing a significant part of the Union’s financial resources used to support European agricultural production (in certain countries). The US has retaliated with its own system of subsidies, driving down world prices and worsening the terms of trade for countries dependent on agricultural exports. The external presence here is largely conflictive, but of course the scrapping of the CAP could be used in the bargaining process.

Like many previous publications in this research field, this report confirms the view that the EU is a strong and recognised economic actor. While history elicits numerous examples of national interests overriding economic
considerations and potential trade relations, the CCP is a triumph of “the community method” over the national interests of individual EU Member States. As Farrell (2008a) points out, “in the area of trade, the EU does well on all … measures of actorness”. Nevertheless, the CAP and occasional concessions to “national” commercial interests in EU trade policy positions highlight the continuing linkages between the internal and external dimension of the EU’s relations with the outside world. The picture is further complicated by the intricate relations between economic cooperation and other policy areas. Trade agreements with partners in the South are increasingly linked to a series of political concerns and conditionalities (good governance, human rights, the environment) falling outside the “community competence”.

Most foreign policy instruments – and the most effective ones – come from the economic field. However, when they are used in the name of sustainable development in other issue areas, such as security, there is a structural conflict between pillars, revealing a lack of coordination, coherence and consistency.

The EU should be understood as a global actor in the field of trade and economic cooperation. However, to be recognised as a more complete actor in world politics, it must move beyond mere trade and economic cooperation. In response to this imperative, EU policymakers have attempted to broaden the EU’s foreign policy portfolio to develop for the organisation a persona akin to a “light” nation-state, or at least to emerge as some form of political actor. There are, however, obvious contradictions in the EFPC, as illustrated by conflicts between the supranational level (especially the Commission’s visions and interests) and the national level (where the desire of many EU Member States to maintain their autonomous decision-making is strong). There is little evidence that this structural conflict between the supranational and the national will be easily resolved in policy areas apart from trade and economic policy. It is apparent that the EU’s power resources reside within the first pillar. To move beyond these contradictions the EU must employ these resources in other pillars or policy areas, such as development and security, both of which express the EU’s ambition to shape the external world.

5.2 International development cooperation

International development cooperation policy is one of the oldest within the EC/EU and has seen more marked changes than other policy areas. The change in this policy area exemplifies the dialectic between internal integration and external action. The successive enlargements in EU mem-
bership have had a number of implications for international development cooperation policy. For instance, the UK brought with it its set of Commonwealth relations, and Portugal and Spain entered with a strong interest in Latin America. The eastern enlargement implied another internal “North-South” dimension (the first came with Greece), involving a reallocation of resources creating a new pyramid of privilege. To the extent that former Eastern Europe has any significant Third World contacts, these are confined to such countries that were close to the former Soviet bloc (such as Vietnam). The EU is nevertheless a major actor in development and its actorness changes over time, as do the various arenas in which EU presence is felt. The number of policy areas of relevance for global development in which the EU is concerned increases constantly, and each of these policy areas have a reciprocal impact on each other (trade, aid, security, environment). The EU harbours an ambition to coordinate these areas; to create coherence and consistency. However, this has been seen as an encroachment by several Member States, including Sweden, since this is an area of shared competence.

In terms of development ideologies there has been an evolution from “associationism” (1960s) towards an increasingly radicalised Lomé system (1980s), to a more neoliberal approach (post-Lomé). The EU’s relations with the African, Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) group of countries are rooted in colonial and neocolonial relations, which are now described in more symmetric terms, as “partnerships”, for instance in the Cotonou Agreement (June 2000). The background to this evolution is the gradual abandoning of the “pyramid of privilege” implied in the Yaoundé and Lomé frameworks that, since the mid-1960s, defined the relationship between the EU and peripheral regions, which were originally selectively favoured in accordance with former colonial interests. Over the years, the ACP countries have been marginalised in the European-led interregional system, but interestingly these countries have made efforts to act as a collective unit, while the EU makes efforts to regionalise and differentiate the group based on two principles: the first based on territorial criteria, and the second on developmental criteria (LDCs, landlocked countries, island countries and so on). On the whole the post-colonial world has been marginalised and the “pyramid of privilege” has shifted to the benefit of the “near abroad”. An additional aspect is the fact that the meaning of development has not remained static from Yaoundé to Cotonou, coinciding with the slow process of dissolution of the North-South system.

The nature of the European external relations approach can be seen in the role that development policy plays, or is supposed to play, in the overall
foreign policy arrangement according to the “European Consensus on Development” (European Union 2005). The main objective is said to be the eradication of poverty in the context of sustainable development, including the pursuit of the MDGs. Coherence (between global development objectives) and consistency (between various European actors) are therefore seen as essential.

Despite the Commission’s growing ambitions to represent the Member States in the field of development policy, evidence suggests that a great deal of work remains to be done before the highly proclaimed “European Consensus on Development” can begin to take tangible form in actual engagements. The institutions of the EU have largely been unsuccessful in developing a common EU development policy, representing the Member States and the EU as a whole. The European Consensus is, as one interviewee put it, “ice-thin”. Since aid and development policy is one of the areas of EU action subject to shared competence, individual EU Member States can – and continue to – conduct national international development policy according to national priorities and preferences (Farrell 2008a). Grimm (2008) adds: “A complete communitarisation of development cooperation is not politically desirable for many EU member states, and would presumably be of questionable value for a number of developing countries.” It has been argued that the Commission conducts its affairs just like any other donor, and it is in many ways perceived as the “28th EU Member State” (interviews, 2006).

The evidence presented in the edited collection, EU and the Global South (Söderbaum and Stålgren 2008), which this report builds on, suggests that in countries and regions where there is a history of engagement by the EU Member States (especially in Africa), the much-vaunted “added value” aspect of the European Commission’s development policy is ambiguous at best, and dysfunctional at worst. The Commission has listed nine specific sectoral areas in which it claims to have a comparative advantage over other development actors (these include trade and regional development, the environment, infrastructure development, and democracy and human rights). As a reminder of the close relationship between the EU’s internal and external dimensions, this list is clearly motivated with reference to the EU’s own historical genesis in terms of peace and welfare, rather than by its track record in developing a coherent policy in the South. The rhetoric represented by the European Consensus appears above all to be a device to boost the Commission’s legitimacy.

The fragmented administrative responsibility within the EU’s institutions is another factor that severely limits the EU’s actorness. As Grimm points
out, the geographical division of responsibilities for external relations within the Commission is indeed problematic with an unsustainable overlap between the mandates of DG Development and DG External Relations (Grimm 2008). Furthermore, interviewees from various Member States with practical experience working with the Commission testified to its inflexible bureaucracy and a lack of willingness to cooperate with other agencies and EU member countries, indicating a lack of commitment to representing a unified EU. Notwithstanding these limitations, as Haglund-Morrissey emphasises (2008), development cooperation in Latin America shows that the European Commission is capable of playing a more substantive role in regions where the EU Member States lack prior engagements or strong commitments.

The Commission’s ability to assert its position where there are few competing actors contributes only marginally to the EU’s actoriness. The Commission must take the European Consensus on Development more seriously, improve the coherence between its policy areas and pursue greater coordination between actors under the EU umbrella. Such minimum measures would contribute to promoting a more fruitful role for the EU in the development field.

5.3 Security and conflict management

Development is closely linked to security and for this reason conflict prevention is another prominent objective. Regional integration has become the main approach to conflict management in Europe. Interstate conflicts within the EU appear to have been consigned to history, in a continent that has been transformed through regional cooperation from a security complex, largely defined by historical tension and war-prone conflict between Germany and France, into a security community, where war is no longer an option for resolving conflicts. Based on its experiences in Europe, the EU is also taking on responsibility for conflict management in the South.

By security regionalism we mean attempts by states and other actors in a particular geographical area – a region in the making – to transform a security complex with conflict-generating interstate and intrastate relations into a security community with cooperative external (interregional) relations and domestic (intra-regional) peace. The concept also includes more acute interventions in crises.

The regional approach to conflict management consists of various dimensions. The existence of the EU has in itself an indirect effect on the pattern of conflict. The goal of ascending to serious candidacy on the waiting list for EU membership constitutes a strong incentive for hopeful states to
keep potential intrastate and interstate conflicts to a minimum, since internal disorder would imply exclusion from “Europe”, in spite of being part of the European security complex. The very existence of the EU makes it unlikely that conflicts close to the core would be permitted to escalate.

The EU’s challenge revolves around how to react to security threats and uncertainties facing the continent. Here, the complexities of the intergovernmental mode of decision-making would appear to be fundamentally at odds with EU actoriness. Until fairly recently a common statement in the literature posits the EU as an economic giant but a political dwarf, with the conclusion that its security policy is consequently weak. More recently the EU has nevertheless begun to demonstrate a considerable amount of activity in the security field. One reason for this lies in the contemporary conceptualisation of security, which goes well beyond conventional large-scale military intervention to include, for example, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and state failure.

The European approach to security is often described as a post-modern, post-Westphalian approach of civilian or soft power, rather than the conventional view of power based on military strength and capacity with the purpose of defending national sovereignty (“hard power”). Europe is not threatened by conventional security risks but by internal disintegration and societal security risks – the risk society. There is now a European Security Strategy (ESS), which states: “large scale aggression against any member state is now improbable. Instead Europe faces new threats which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable” (European Council 2003: 3). The key threats mentioned are terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime. Several of these are linked even though they belong to different pillars, and together they constitute a “radical threat”. In the face of the multiplicity of new threats, the EU Member States have been able to overcome some of their internal differences, which have led to a consolidation of the EU as a global actor. Similarly, the philosophy that “conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early” (EU Council 2003: 7) has precipitated an EU proactivity that has given the intergovernmental machinery of decision-making adequate time to respond. This also includes the possibility of linking different policy areas. The EU claims to be well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations (ibid: 7).

The EU’s approach to conflict management is of course influenced by the nature of different EFPRs. According to the ESS: “Even in an era of globalisation, geography is still important.” The neighbourhood, therefore, plays a central role in the EU’s security strategy (Charillon 2004). Due to
the securitisation of the development issue an increasing portion of development aid is redirected from the South to the neighbourhood region. The frontier between “Europe”, as organised by the EU, and surrounding areas is unclear and problematic; as countries in some of these areas become new members or applicants, others are defined (through a political discourse) as being “non-Europe” (but nevertheless “near abroad”). There is no consensus behind these labels. The area of this contentious space is large and includes much of the post-Soviet space, Eastern and Central Europe, the Balkans, and the Mediterranean non-members.

In discussing regional crisis management in the longer perspective, it is important to link security regionalism and development regionalism. The two aspects of regionalism, security and development, are complementary and mutually supportive. By development regionalism we thus mean the concerted effort of a group of countries within a geographical region to enhance the economic complementarity of the constituent political units and capacity of the total regional economy.

The general method involved in the foreign policy towards the near abroad is a soft form of imperialism (asymmetric partnership) based on condition-alities, the prize ranging from development assistance over association agreements to full membership (Hettne and Söderbaum 2005). The success story is the transformation and integration of Central and Eastern Europe, which in fact implied a large number of resolved and prevented conflicts. However, this success related to “potential Europe” rather than an internal European success story. A distinction must therefore be made between integration and stabilisation. For countries excluded from potential membership, the policy of stabilisation constitutes a de facto and rather weak form of influence, particularly as the resource issue becomes more problematic. Thus, actoriness shifts from one context to another, and a stabilisation policy can shift to association and, in some cases still, integration. For the real South, especially Africa, the relative weight of Europe – its presence – is formidable. The question is whether these experiences and realities will make Europe a more efficient security actor in the “Near Abroad” or more “Far Away” Africa, Latin America and Asia.

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the Barcelona Process has been the most important instrument for peace and stability in the Mediterranean Middle East. It is yet another indicator of the close connection between the EU’s internal evolution and the nature of its external policies. However, although the EMP process has achieved laudable results in pursuit of Middle East peace, it has been hampered by a number of limitations: asymmetric negotiating positions, conflicting interests within both
the Middle East and the EU, and a lack of genuine trust within the EU of the Arab partners, arising from the commonly held EU view of the region as notoriously unstable and as a cradle of international terrorism. Meanwhile, the Arab states have viewed the EMP as an instrument to promote EU interests rather than as a framework for a common security agenda (Lindholm-Schulz 2008).

Notwithstanding that the EU is often referred to as an important actor in the Middle East, it has also failed to provide a unified response in this region, especially in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. It should of course be recognised that the EU formed part of the Quartet – together with the Russian Federation, the UN and the US – which was central in formulating “the Roadmap for Peace” in April 2002, in response to the escalation of violence in the region. However, the lack of a unified EU policy stance is explained, according to Lindholm-Schulz (2008), through the competing and divergent interests between major EU Member States, and the sensitivities involved in yielding national sovereignty in the area of armed engagement. Consequently, “European policymaking towards the Middle East is still largely formed through bilateral policies by individual member states” (Lindholm-Schulz 2008).

As regards the regionalisation of conflict, the reference is both to the outward spread or spillover of a local conflict into neighbouring countries, and to the inward impact of the region, in the form of more or less diplomatic interference, military intervention and, preferably, conflict resolution, carried out by some kind of regional body.

The EU’s involvement in the regional conflict configuration in the Great Lakes region (GLR) is an important test case for the EU’s conflict management capacity in more far away regions. The EU’s limited and short-term intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) province of Ituri in 2004 (Operation Artemis) is quite often cited as a success (Smis and Kingah 2008). However, as a consequence of divergent Member States’ interests in the region, the EU only managed a half-hearted response to the conflict. Despite repeated declarations in the EU’s CSFP that conflict resolution in the GLR was a top priority, the Union’s weak degree of actoriness was apparent in its slow progress towards a clear response to the conflict.

Similarly, the EU played only a marginal role in the case of the Colombian conflict configuration, which according to de Lombaerde et. al. (2008) should be understood as a reflection of weak interests and a lack of genuine historical connections to the region on behalf of major powers.
within the Union. Lombaerde et. al. (2008) argue that better policy coordination within the EU would have a positive effect on solving the conflict.

There are many reasons why a region-centred approach might be relevant in the emerging global security context. For instance, the regional spillovers and regionalisation of many so-called domestic conflicts require regional solutions, which is evident in cases such as the Middle East, Great Lakes region, and Colombia. Moreover, regional organisations are often better than multilateral efforts at addressing conflict prevention as well as post-conflict reconstruction. To the extent that the EU gets involved some kind of interregional arrangement is preferable. In Africa this is needed in order to stabilise the financial base for African Union (AU) operations, and in Asia this is needed for diplomatic reasons. Thus in the problematic case of Burma ASEAN is more likely to get on terms with the military regime than an EU operating on its own.
6 THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE SOUTH

Interregionalism has become a strong component of the EU’s relations with Africa, Asia and Latin America, even if the pattern of relations is highly varied. We argue that it is important to distinguish between interregionalism as a formalised relation between two distinct regional organisations, and relations among regions in a more general sense: transregionalism. The latter could include relations between numerous kinds of regional actors (including formal regional organisations), on the one hand, and other diverse actors, state and non-state, on the other. Bilateral relations encompass conventional state-to-state relations, as well as relations between the EU and larger powers (China, Japan, USA, Brazil, India, South Africa) which often follow a similar Westphalian logic. When such bilateral “EU-state” relations are taking place within a regional setting they can be referred to as “hybrid interregionalism”. A growing and increasingly dense global network of transregional, hybrid interregional and interregional links ultimately implies a regionalised world order, which can be termed regional multilateralism (or simply multiregionalism). This presupposes that interregionalism is inherently symmetric, which appears to be the case at a rhetorical level. However, experience presents a far more complex and diverse picture.

One of the novelties of this report is that it links actorship and interregionalism. For two regions to establish a functioning interregional relationship it is essential that both regions have achieved a certain degree of regional actorship. The policy of interregionalism is pursued energetically by the EU, whereas other regions, even if they are organised as regions, have little say. This situation creates an asymmetrical relationship. The greater the difference in actorship of two interlinked regions the greater the asymmetries.

Interregional relations are thus possible between all organised regions with a certain degree of actorship. In this project the main focus has been on the EU’s relations with Africa, Asia and Latin America with special reference to the three core dimensions of global development: trade, aid and security. The main research product stemming from this project, EU and the Global South (Söderbaum and Stålgren 2008) contains case studies on the three dimensions in all three regional counterparts.

6.1 EU-Africa

The EU’s relations with the ACP group of countries are testimony to a long history of “interregionalism”, in a somewhat embryonic and “hybrid” form. The EU-ACP partnership has historically focused on humanitarian
issues and a particular trading relationship. However, this is now being redefined. Despite the developmental orientation of previous interregionalism between EU and the ACP group, especially under the Lomé Agreements, the ACP bloc failed to achieve any noticeable improvement in levels of development. The Cotonou Agreement reflects a stronger emphasis on aspects such as reciprocal trade, political conditionalities, supporting region-based economic cooperation and integration (both multilateralism and interregional integration through the EPAs), human rights and democracy and the so-called “war on terror”. We are facing a major transformation of a historical pattern of interregionalism, in many ways heading towards more pure interregionalism, although the outcome still lacks a concrete shape.

Africa, in particular, illustrates the complexity of interregional relations and the question of symmetry versus asymmetry. The EU’s official rhetoric emphasises that a closer integration of the African countries and regions into the global economy is the future for trading relations as well as a development strategy in itself; which the EU asserts should be for mutual gain (European Commission 2004: 3). According to one of the studies carried out within the framework of this research project, Africa is attractive to Europe for its markets and natural resources, and the EU’s interregionalism is not solely driven by the ideal and norm-laden values so often emphasised by political leaders and policymakers in the EU’s official discourse (Farrell 2008a). The same author is also critical of the shift of emphasis in the interregional partnership from aid to trade, and towards increased political conditionality and the interregional political dialogue, which are means for the EU to establish “hegemonic control” (ibid). The new type of interregionalism with Africa is, Farrell claims, reinforcing the power asymmetries between the African group of countries and the EU.

In this context it is significant that the EU differentiates between ACP countries, and that the EU is in the process of establishing economic partnership agreements (EPAs) with geographically more focused sub-regions of Africa, as well as the other ACP regions. This can be seen as not only a strengthening of formal interregionalism, but even a novel form. However, this interregionalism is only in its infancy, and in some instances the EU is in fact undermining existing regional organisations; the Southern African Development Community (SADC) is the most prominent example in this regard, since the EU negotiates with two groups within SADC (i.e. ESA and SADC8). Also, the EU encounters the difficult double mission of demonstrating its comparative advantage in functional terms, and creating a European donor identity distinct from the Member States.
The EU’s international development cooperation in Africa is particularly interesting due to the coexistence of an EU development cooperation policy and policies pursued by the individual EU Member States. This results in a rather complex relationship between the EU and Africa in this field. For instance, there is a significant contrast between the EU’s official policy, as formulated in discourse and in Brussels, and the logic of development cooperation taking place in practice, both in terms of the promotion of regions and in country-level assistance (Söderbaum and Stålgren 2008). Officially the policy of the EU claims to promote EU-African interregional cooperation and regional cooperation in Africa, and to act as a node of coordination within the EU (building a common EU development policy). Although there is a trend for regions to emerge as counterparts in development cooperation, most donors (including the European Commission) have their own individual programmes for supporting region-building in Africa and there are a series of overlapping and sometimes competing donor-driven region-building programmes. The few initiatives that are seen for coordination of regional programmes are driven by bilateral actors or by multilateral organisations, rather than by the EU, and there is at best only embryonic interregionalism in terms of international development cooperation. Countries continue to be the most important counterparts in international development cooperation, and the EU does not function as a platform for coordination between the Member States. Hence, the Commission simply acts as “the 28th” Member State, conducting its own aid policies, rather than serving as the hub for donor coordination within the EU as a whole. The most important mechanisms for donor coordination are instead taking place within multilateral frameworks, such as the Paris Agenda or the UN framework, or in more flexible budget support mechanisms and lead donor mechanisms, severely curtailing the perception of the EU as a collective actor. In other words, there is a long way to go before we can speak of a common EU approach to Africa in the field of development cooperation.

Moving to the security field, the case study in our edited volume, *EU and the Global South*, analyses the EU’s approach to conflict management in the Great Lakes region, with a particular focus on the conflict in the DRC. The regional nature of this conflict has resulted in a series of African and externally-induced conflict management strategies. Although Smis and Kingah (2008) suggest that the EU-led Operation Artemis can be seen as a somewhat successful, albeit limited, interregional response, the authors’ main argument is that the EU has adopted an unassertive interregional approach to conflict management in the Great Lakes region. The reasons for this are both internal to the EU (for example, a lack of coordination
and poorly defined policies within the EU, poor funding and a general neglect of African crises), and external – related to the nature of the conflict itself and the roles and interests of other actors (for example, conflicting interests among African states, competing regional configurations and regional organisations, the role of third countries and vested corporate interests).

6.2 EU-Asia

In Asia, EU has had a long-standing relationship with ASEAN. Grimm’s case study (2008) describes three phases of the EU’s relations with Southeast Asia. The first phase (1967-1980) was informal and loosely structured around ASEAN. The second phase (1980-1994) was largely driven by geopolitics, and aid relations with Southeast Asia increased rapidly during these years. Internal and external events in the early 1990s again changed the relationship between the EU and Southeast Asia, from which emerged the EU’s Asia strategy in 1994, and the establishment of the ASEM framework a few years later.

The EU’s Asia strategy from 1994 was a late reaction to the rise of Asia. Similarly the ASEM initiative came from the Asian side as a consequence of the economic rise of post-Maastricht Europe. Thus there was a changing perspective of geopolitics involved. There are several competing regionalisms in the larger region, i.e. Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia (increasingly referred to as East Asia). There are also expressions of a more exclusivist Asian regionalism within this larger region. The Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir once proposed an East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC). This was meant to be a sort of Asian response to the threat of European and North American “fortresses”. The EAEC proposal slowly gained support among other ASEAN countries and to some extent China, whereas Japan took a more sceptical attitude, reflecting US neagtivism against Asian regionalism. It is currently not on the agenda, but neither is it dead and buried. ASEM can be seen as an intermediate position as it provides opportunities for Asian cooperation. ASEM is by both partners seen as a welcome opportunity to discuss controversial issues in an informal but nevertheless slightly institutionalised context.

“Larger East Asia” is dominated by the two rival great powers, China and Japan, both of which the EU maintains bilateral relations with. This region therefore presents a complex mixture of various types of orthodox state-to-state bilateralism, EU-bilateralism and transregionalism/interregionalism. As with EU-African relations, EU-Asia interregionalism is comprehensive and multisectoral, spanning trade and investments, politics, security and
anti-terrorism, culture, technology and science, drug trafficking, environmental protection, and so on. ASEM, involving the EU and “ASEAN Plus Three” (China, Japan and South Korea), represents a new type of inter-regionalism, combining bilateralism and interregionalism to accommodate the relative influence of China and Japan. An impressive variety of issues are included within the ASEM framework, but the agenda tends to be ad hoc.

The uniqueness of ASEM is that it is one of the few international organisations of political importance where the USA is not a member, which is bound to be divisive in both camps, where there are some states which value their relations with the USA more, should it come to a conflict of interest. It should also be noted that one of the reasons for ASEM was that the EU was denied association status to APEC. ASEM is on paper a comprehensive, multidimensional type of collaboration in spite of limited formalisation (the EU-ASEAN relationship constitutes the backbone). Much of this comprehensiveness is still unfulfilled and among the three pillars – economic, political and cultural relations – the economic, trade and investment, has been in focus. It has been called “hybrid interregionalism” (Gilson 2006) since it combines transregionalism and interregionalism. The danger of a too ritualised diplomacy is obvious from reading the official documents emanating from ASEM meetings. The lack of institutionalised relationship works against an accumulation of shared stakes. It is a partnership where the level of institutionalisation of the respective partners is highly uneven. However, as Julie Gilson puts it “ASEM provides a mechanism for institutionalising not only a partnership, but also the partner per se” (Gilson 2006). The point here is that by participating in an interregional process, a regional identity is created. Thus ASEAN Plus Three (APT) is emerging as a new regional actor in the wake of crises in ASEAN and APEC. The possibility that this body may develop into a new regional formation is at least under discussion. The US unilateral war against terrorism is creating doubts both in Europe and in Asia, where regional and multilateral approaches are much preferred. Thus the EU explicitly shares China’s concern for a more balanced international order based on effective multilateralism (European Commission 2003).

The ASEM process shows that the institutionalisation of interregional relations, and indeed multiregionalism, are very slow processes, and their emergence here is susceptible to sudden changes in the geopolitical environment. Indeed, interregionalism itself aims to make this environment more stable and predictable. This is not possible without a much deeper institutionalisation, drawing on the European experience. This institution-
alisation, however, cannot go deeper than the Asian model of informal consensus building allows. This results in what has been called “soft institutionalisation” (Acharya 2001). The EU’s Asia strategy states that “there is no single ‘European model’ of social governance” (European Commission 2001b: 17). One interpretation of this is that the EU places considerably less emphasis on good governance and human rights in its relations with Asia than it does in relation to Africa, for example. In its relations with Asia, the EU accepts different Asian views about the freeing up of markets and trade as well. This again contrasts sharply with the EU-Africa relationship, where the EU emphasises both economic and market-based liberalisation as well as political conditionality.

6.3 EU-Latin America

In the diplomatic relations between Europe and Latin America there has been a strong emphasis on shared culture, which obviously is somewhat rhetorical. Europe’s relations with Latin America were intensified in the 1990s after a long period of neglect or simply focusing on individual countries, and Central America, where Europe in the 1980s clearly distanced itself from the US in its view of the regional conflict as being North-South rather than East-West.

The EU has developed interregional partnerships with most relevant sub-regions, such as the Andean region, Central America, and above all Mercosur. The latter is a case of pure interregionalism, as there exists an agreement between two regional organisations (the EU-Mercosur Interregional Framework Co-operation Agreement, EMIFCA). This interregional framework is built on three pillars: the first includes a political dialogue, the second substantive financial support to Mercosur’s institutional development and the third, economic and commercial cooperation. The origins of the partnership are in trade relations, and this aspect remains particularly strong, through an interregional free trade agreement, which maintains quotas only in agriculture and some other sensitive goods. Gradually, interregional cooperation has spread to emphasise other sectors, such as economic cooperation, development cooperation and political dialogue and common “values”. Santander (2008) reveals a picture of the EU-Mercosur partnership similar to that of EU-African relations. The value-laden motive of win-win cooperation through free interregional trade is emphasised, together with the economically self-interested objective of bolstering the EU’s presence and access to fast growing economies.

Santander highlights that this interregional partnership is developing in the context of economic globalisation and economic competition with the US.
The EU’s aim is not only to conquer new markets for European business, but also to build the EU’s strength as a global actor. The barriers to strengthening EU-Mercosur interregionalism lie not only in the economic and trade issues at stake, but even more so in the strong vested interests within EU Member States and a lack of coordination within the EU.

Santander notes that the EU is highly committed to free trade in its official rhetoric, but that it maintains its high non-tariff barriers for agricultural products, where the weaker partners would otherwise have the most to gain. Hence, on this account, the EU-Mercosur cooperation is an inter-regional relationship built primarily on the interests of the strongest. However, the EU has served as a regional model and the two regions share similar motives for regionalisation related to the overall world situation.

In the case study on the EU’s interregional development cooperation in Latin America, it is described how the latter’s previously marginal role in the EU’s development policy has changed, and that today the EU constitutes the most important donor in the region (Haglund-Morrissey 2008). The EU, through the Commission, has been involved in a series of inter-regional relationships with various regional and sub-regional organisations in Latin America, often involving a range of civil society actors. At the same time the EU has engaged in country-level relationships through hybrid interregionalism and region-state relationships, as well as through classical (state-to-state) bilateralism. With some exceptions, many EU countries have shown a limited interest in the region. However the Commission has stepped in to act on behalf of Member States as a collective representative. On some occasions the Commission has been a broker between competing national interests. The EU’s role in sustaining various forms of interregionalism in Latin America in combination with its role in facilitating coordination within the EU has strengthened the perception of the EU’s actoriness since the early 1990s.

The Colombian case study carried out by de Lombaerde et. al. (2008) draws attention to the national, regional and international dimensions of this conflict, in combination with the fact that it cuts across several policy areas and competencies within the EU. The case study illustrates the multiplicity of actors that lie behind the abstract notions of “Europe” and even the “EU”, and the challenges that this poses for the EU as a unified actor. Much of the explanation behind the lack of coordination within the EU lies in competing national interests, in combination with the underdeveloped analytical capacity on the European side to enable both an understanding of the regional character of the conflict, and agreement on appropriate conflict management strategies. An additional obstacle is the fact
that the EU has no regional counterpart to relate to, other than the Andean Community, which has proven to be dysfunctional in dealing with the Colombian conflict (hence weak regional actorship on the counterpart). This suggests an intimate relationship between the lack of regional actorship on the part of the EU and the Andean Community and the negative impact that this has on interregionalism.

6.4 Asymmetries in EU-South relations

Our analysis of the EU’s foreign policy and external relations with Africa, Asia and Latin America shows that the EU uses a variety of instruments and models of engagement to foster relations with countries and regional partners. As we have seen, EU-driven interregionalism tends to be multifaceted, with different issues and themes receiving different emphasis between regions. Interregional policy is, therefore, not a fixed set of guidelines but is rather subject to adaptation. A comparative assessment suggests a variation in the way the EU conducts its foreign policies towards different regions.

This implies that the EU has no preference for one particular model of cooperation. It is evident that the EU tends to be pragmatic in its various relationships with the South. In this regard, the EU increasingly behaves as an actor on a variety of levels in world affairs – “a global strategy” (Farrell 2008b). Far from being locked into a specific foreign policy doctrine (such as interregionalism), the EU uses any type of policy that it has at its disposal and which appears to be most suited to a given objective. For instance, Santander (2008) shows that as long as European economic interests are not threatened, the EU concentrates its energy on the multilateral negotiations within the WTO, instead of further deepening the interregional relationship between the EU and Mercosur.

EU-Asia relationships are somewhat different: “While the EU has combined pure interregionalism with forms of hybrid interregionalism, there is a growing preference for hybrid interregionalism. This may be explained in part by the difficulty of negotiating over very complex and politically contentious issues with disparate groups of countries. The EU has found that the difficulty of completing such negotiations, and the subsequent problems in implementation and compliance, make different forms of region-state treaties a more effective instrument for economic cooperation” (Farrell 2008b). Hence, despite constant official declarations about the EU’s preference for interregional relations, a closer empirical review reveals a complex pattern of intersecting, complementing and at times competing models of external relations (resulting in a mixture of bilateral,
multilateral and interregional policies in a world with external and internal obstacles)

Our analysis reveals that the EU’s policy mix depends very much on who the counterpart is. We argue that this variation in interregional relations is linked to questions of relevance and power. The EU cannot deny the contemporary relevance and power of key East Asian states, which results in partnerships that are symmetric in nature. This contrasts sharply with the EU-Africa relationship, which, although officially designated as an equal partnership, at least for now clearly remains asymmetrical (European Commission 2004: 9). A similar asymmetry, although not as one-sided, can also be detected in the EU’s relationship with Latin America.

This suggests that, while much of the EU’s interregional relations are conducted under the pretext of mutual benefit, the distribution of these benefits appears to be a function of the relative power position of the EU relative to its counterparts. The stronger the counterpart (in terms of actorship), the more concessions are made by the EU. With weaker “partners”, the EU dictates far more of the conditions for interregional cooperation. The relatively stronger East Asian region benefits from access to European markets and the regional organisations are generally invited to participate in equal or symmetric partnerships with the EU. There is little conditionality attached to East Asian interregional cooperation, which reflects the EU’s response to an increasingly powerful region. However, the EU attaches economic, trade and political conditionalities in its dealings with Africa. The EU’s dealings with Latin America appear to lie somewhere between these extremes.
7 CONCLUSION

Since its inception, the EU’s external relations and foreign policies have become increasingly comprehensive, and complex, spanning most regions and countries in the world, and most fields of activity. The number of policy areas managed by the EU appears to be increasing correspondingly with the EU’s internal complexity, creating immense problems of coordination and coherence. This report has primarily dealt with three policy areas within global development and three counterpart regions in which the EU displays contrasting actor behaviour. In an effort to describe the characteristics of this peculiar actor, the report has presented an at times contradictory account of the EU’s external relations and its policy of global development towards Africa, Asia and Latin America. The next section summarises the main findings and the report then concludes with a discussion on what Member States can do in order to improve the EU’s role as an actor in the field of global development.

7.1 Main findings

Our analysis started out with a framework for analysing regional agency and actorship and described the emergence of Europe as a regional actor, the first such political phenomenon in the world, albeit an unfinished project. The rather long historical perspective was meant to create a better understanding of why so many problems of coordination remain. The foreign policy machinery of the EU has not been designed in order to maximise actoress but diverse historical processes has resulted in a patchwork. The EU’s external relations were characterised as the EU’s foreign policy complex (EFPC) structured around different modes of decision-making, the outdated pillar system, a multiplicity of common institutions and policy instruments, and conflicting objectives in an ever-increasing number of policy areas. Since the components of the EU’s policy machinery never were designed to create a unified and consistent global actor, a more effective actorship will only emerge from a process of trial and error. The Lisbon Treaty, if ratified, will however be a conscious step in this direction.

The notion of the EFPC reveals that the reality and practice of the EU’s external relations is more complex, multidimensional and ambiguous than the EU acknowledges in its official policy discourse. Furthermore, the case studies presented reveal that the EFPC changes over time, due to a number of endogenous and exogenous factors, each carrying different weight in different policy areas and in different counterpart regions. This also implies a constantly changing perception of the European “identity”.

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The EU’s currently patchy external relations result from its unique historical development and often competing interests of actors both outside and inside the Union, which have been institutionalised in organisations and legal prescriptions that have taken on lives of their own.

The report draws attention to the EU’s multifaceted policy mix in its external relations. Notwithstanding the significant emphasis given to the EU’s support for regional integration and interregionalism, in the EU’s official discourse concerning its economic relations with far away counterpart regions in Africa, Asia and Latin America, the Union maintains a diverse policy mix based on multilateralism, bilateralism and various kinds of interregionalisms. Interregional arrangements are without doubt feeble and contradictory, but they nevertheless signify an interest in and a growing need for interregionalism in a more viable form. A regionalised world order derived from still embryonic, transregional formations would challenge the homogenising tendency of contemporary globalisation by working for a multipolar or rather multicentric world order, with self-centred but not autarchic regions, each rooted in historical civilisations. The regions should be internally multicultural, similar to the historical empires, which have provided humanity with a relevant polity for a much longer time than the homogenising nation-states system, combining political order with pragmatic tolerance against “minorities”, or the subdued peoples, as long as the tribute was delivered. The problem is to transform former imperial hierarchical systems into horizontal, voluntary and democratic regional systems.

Europe is slowly moving towards a new kind of polity (regional institutionalised polity). Attempts to boost the EU’s legitimacy in global politics, particularly by the European Commission but also by certain EU Member States and the European Parliament, evince an increasing emphasis and rhetoric centred on the EU as a “civilian power”, its “superior” normative foundation, and the “added value” contribution of the EU beyond individual EU Member State capabilities.

As far as the EU’s use of power is concerned, it is clear that the EU has dealt with the external world in a different manner from that of an ordinary great power driven by geopolitical interests. This is because the civilian power employed in the EU’s own region building is also being projected in its external relations as the preferred world order model (Telò 2006, Linklater 2005). It has been argued that the very meaning of “Europe” is in fact the non-existence of a clear borderline between internal and external. Europe is trying to shape world order by means of inclusiveness, by treating the external as if it were internal, a political innovation
which marks a significant departure from traditional realist power politics (which by the way were also born in Europe). Each enlargement implies a new neighbourhood, often defined in security terms and thus in need of stabilisation. Enlargement thus solves one particular security problem by internalising it, at the same time as the problematic security complex is transformed. The secret behind the EU’s success in this regard is its transformative power: to invite the other to become a partner, rather than imposing its own will. What is enlarged is not “Europe” but a particular economic and political system, or even a community of values (Leonard 2005: 110). Some would call this a kind of imperialism – “soft imperialism” – in contrast to the much talked about civilian power (Hettne and Söderbaum 2005). It is clear that the policies have failed to instil confidence in the partners, whether Arab, Indian, Latin American, African or otherwise. However, the outcome is, in spite of all the contradictions, a pattern of global governance with its own distinctive characteristics and with the potential of becoming a world order characterised by a horizontal, institutionalised, multipolar structure of regions cooperating in a spirit of multilateralism. Such a regionalised, multilateral world order could be called “multiregionalism”.

We then looked closer into the field of development, which in the current globalised condition is referred to variously as “sustainable” and “global”. Here, the latter concept was chosen as the more inclusive. From focussing on trade policy privileging former colonies, the more complex development tasks of fighting poverty, managing conflict, reconstructing war-torn societies, protecting biodiversity and combating harmful climate change have been considered to be interrelating development issues constituting an enormous challenge as far as coordination is concerned.

In reviewing the EU’s policies in three of the most important policy areas of global development across three continents, this report concludes that much remains to be done before this benevolent European actor can present itself credibly to the world. Much like other global actors, including the most powerful EU Member States, the EU’s actions are characterized by the pursuit of power and the manifestation of identities. The nation-state logic is still active. Going beyond the EU’s official strategies and policy statements (which invariably contain a strong, but perhaps misleading, egalitarian flavour) our study suggests that its deeds are strongly concerned with establishing itself as a global actor and with gaining political power. From a realist perspective, the EU is therefore a rather familiar species in international relations. This can, to some extent, be explained by the contradictions inherent in the EFPC, where increasingly strong national inter-
ests counter a much weaker supranational policy. A new treaty placing more emphasis on the supranational level would at least remove some obstacles to realising the EU’s explicit and most central ambition in creating a more efficient actorship: achieving coherence, coordination and consistency.

This report confirms the common view that the EU is a strong and recognised economic actor. Indeed, many of the individual Member States have subordinated themselves to the EU’s common economic and trading agenda. It is difficult to identify major conflicts within the EU concerning economic and trading relations towards the South. This coincides with the European Commission’s strong role and competence, and majority voting in the Council. However, despite trade and economic cooperation being the most distinct example of EU actorness, the Commission’s ability to present a unified EU is compromised by this area’s complex relations with other policy fields. As noted earlier, the disparate competencies and institutional solutions in other policy areas complicate the EU’s objectives of policy coherence and coordinated actoriness, which in turn undermines global development. In this regard, the EU’s ambition of becoming a global actor beyond trade and commercial policy is severely hampered by its pillar structure, and the structural conflict between pillars, revealing a lack of coordination, coherence, and consistency.

Although the EU seeks to be portrayed as an actor in the field of international development cooperation, this report highlights the ambiguous nature of the EU as an actor within this policy field. Donor coordination is rapidly improving at the country level, but these processes are usually centred upon a variety of largely multilateral or ad hoc country-based mechanisms rather than the EU. In fact, arguably, the European Commission can in this capacity be regarded as “just another donor”, and the Union remains dysfunctional as a coordination mechanism.

There is a clear trend whereby regions emerge as counterparts to countries in international development cooperation. However, most donors pursue individual region-building programmes in isolation from other donors, resulting in a multitude of overlapping and at times competing region building programmes. Hence, it becomes evident that the EU does not present a unified approach in this regard either; the clearest example of EU interregionalism in the field of development cooperation is in Latin America. This appears to be the result of indifference on the part of most EU Member States compared to the relatively strong position of the European Commission.
The EU is, in general, a poorly coordinated actor in the field of conflict management, often failing to develop a coordinated response at both country and regional levels. The most organised interregional response identified here is the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), but this is also fragile; in spite of the fact that the EU has invested a great deal of resources into the EMP, there is no single EU voice in the Middle East security discussion, but rather many diverging and sometimes competing positions among EU Member States. The EU’s response to the conflict in the Great Lakes region is mixed. The EU managed to lead Operation Artemis, but this was a limited response and there was a lack of coordinated action on the part of the EU. Whereas the Middle East and Great Lakes region draw attention to divergent interests among EU Member States, the Colombian conflict underlines that there are no clearly defined interests among major powers within the EU at all, which explains the weak degree of EU actorness in this regard.

7.2 Promoting the EU as a global actor in global development

The question what Sweden and other Member States can do to improve the EU’s position as an actor in the field of global development should finally be raised, under the assumption that there is added value in such policies compared to EU Member States acting separately. The most challenging development problems are that national responses do not make much sense today. Sweden is a small country without much direct impact. The best policy would therefore be to provide a role model and work through the EU and, as the case may be, multilateral institutions. As noted in this report, the interregional strategy of the EU, not really acknowledged in Sweden, is very appropriate as a mechanism of global governance and development assistance, including institution-building. Such an interregional policy might preferably focus on regional organisations in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Sweden still has a good reputation in the areas of development assistance and environmental protection. Policy coherence is a prominent feature of the Swedish policy for global development and there are lessons for the EU to draw here. In Sweden it is now normal to see development assistance and security assistance as two sides of the same coin, and this is becoming the general position at the EU level as well. The risk in this context is that the security dimension is overemphasised and that development funds are transferred to conflict management and peacekeeping. The new imperative is that not only must these two interlinked policy areas be balanced, they have to be implemented in the context of climate change, triggering both economic crises and various types of con-
flicts, feeding on each other. In order to resolve these problems a larger degree of regulation as part of global governance will be needed.

From a global development perspective, there is a striking governance gap. The concept of global governance is by itself recognition of the possibility of a rules bound order, a refutation of the anarchical model of international relations as well as the utopia of the self-regulating market. The disrupting social consequences of deterritorialisation implied in the process of market-led globalisation generate political forces to halt and modify the process of globalisation in order to guarantee territorial control, cultural diversity, and human security. It is also of importance that weaker/intermediate regions are capable of advancing their interest in changing the structure of comparative advantages rather than simply adapting to the received pattern of comparative advantages. Transnational and interregional institutions are needed in order to fill this governance gap.

It can be argued that the European regional integration model – due to its strong focus on the role of institutions in Europe’s own integration process as well as on the importance of institutionalised interregional relations – represents a potential world order. The European Union is in the process of building interregional relations with all regions of the world. The overall purpose of interregionalism is to make the external environment of Europe, that is the rest of the world, more stable and more predictable. The significance of this experience is that interregional and transregional institutions have the potential to shape, through intersubjectivity and mutual learning, the outlook of regional civilisations towards compatible patterns of coexistence, ultimately through multiculturalism and multiregionalism (Hettne 2008a and b).

The policy principles raised below for promoting the EU as a global actor in this field are based on two considerations: the comparative advantage of regionalism, and the need to improve the relationship between regionalism and other levels of governance, especially multilateralism.

Trade and economic cooperation
Regionalism has a comparative advantage compared to the multilateral trading system (WTO) for at least two main reasons: first, regionalism can go beyond narrow trade liberalisation and “barrier-dropping”, and second, regionalism can provide a link between trade integration and other economic and non-economic sectors. More specifically, the benefits from regional and multilateral trade liberalisation are much less significant than what they used to be, due to the fact that the world is today dramatically different compared to the 1960s-1980s, which, somewhat paradoxically results in the need for a broader approach.
Many scholars and policymakers emphasise the need for some intervention by political institutions and for policy manoeuvring to generate innovative development policies which are ultimately more important than trade liberalisation alone in order to make the regional market more effective and fair. This line of thinking can be said to be part of the EU model. It has started to have an effect in different versions in other parts of the world. The strategy is only possible to manage through multidimensional and comprehensive regional organisations with a certain degree of actorship, such as the EU, SADC, ASEAN and increasingly Mercosur, since these can exploit spillover effects and linkages between trade, economic and political sectors/benefits, which is much more difficult or even impossible to do within frameworks restricted to trade matters, such as the WTO or NAFTA.

Regionalism will often work more easily and effectively compared to multilateralism, which is dependent on 200 or more unequal nation-states and dominated by the G8 and the OECD countries. Regions may also be good vehicles for smaller countries to increase their bargaining power and voice in multilateral trade. The most pragmatic and effective solution is a “regional multilateralism”, whereby multilateralism is rebuilt on the foundations of regionalism.

One of many policy implications is that institutional and technical capacities of regional trade organisations in the developing world need to be strengthened in order for them to develop policies and assess consequences of various types of trade relations and negotiations (multilateral, inter-regional and intraregional).

It must be emphasised that trade regionalism needs to be integrated in an interlevel approach, where regional and multilateral trading arrangements in particular are complementary rather than competing as often tends to be the case today. This also involves interregionalism. Hence: the EU should reconcile multilateral, interregional and regional integration arrangements. Sweden has a role to play here through its commitment to multilateral principles, including regional multilateralism even if the potential of interregionalism is neglected in Sweden.

International development cooperation
The “European Consensus” is based on the need for a common European development policy. Three components are particularly important: the added value of the EU, coordination and coherence.

Although there is a growing agreement on the added value of EU aid compared to bilateral cooperation, this report shows that there are many ambi-
guities and uncertainties regarding when EU/European Commission aid brings added value and also to what extent such added value is actually realised in practice.

The enormous potential added value of the EU is thus not being realised. Most importantly this added value would be a comprehensive international development policy in which problems of unequal trade, poverty, environmental degradation, conflicts, migration are understood in a holistic way. Of particular interest is the EU focus on regional integration as a venue for development and regionalism as a mode of global governance. As mentioned above, from a global development perspective, there is a striking governance gap, and the EU’s weak actoriness is part of this problem.

There are severe coordination problems of EU development cooperation. Often the European Commission is not functioning as a coordination mechanism within the EU, and it can be understood as “just another donor”. Although politicians and policymakers frequently emphasise that the EU is the world’s biggest aid player, this can mainly be understood in terms of “presence” rather than a capacity to act or capacity to actively coordinate. In essence, the EU is as yet not a fullfledged global actor.

This report also highlights fundamental questions related to coherence. Often it seems that aid is aligned with trade and foreign policy objectives rather than vice versa, as exemplified by the EPAs and CAP, and both undermine global development. Sweden has the capacity to act as a role model through its Policy for Global Development. Sweden can also be a role model and promoter of ensuring emphasis on poverty reduction rather than other objectives which may be more instrumental for the interests of individual Member States.

Sweden has a good record in international development, peace actions and environmental concerns, as well as a high volume of development assistance. The Swedish policy on global development is an effort to tackle various interconnected problems. Unfortunately Sweden belongs to the “reluctant Europeans”, which means that Sweden’s special competence is not really used in the EU development activities, partly because there are good reasons to criticise the EU’s activities for being uncoordinated, inefficient and bureaucratic. There is a need to overcome this so that Sweden, together with some other donors, can act as role models, while the EU makes use of its potential as a global actor for global and sustainable development. This of course necessitates a stronger commitment from both Sweden and the EU. Furthermore, Sweden with a good record in multilateral operations should use its influence to minimize possible contra-
dictions between multilateral and regional approaches (regional multilateralism). A symbolic issue is the volume of aid, which is far too low in many cases. Sweden must provide leadership here.

Security and conflict management
There are many reasons why a region-centred approach might be more relevant than a UN-led approach in the emerging global security context. For instance, the regional spillovers and regionalisation of many so-called domestic conflicts require regional solutions, which is evident in cases such as the Great Lakes region. The regional approach is also more efficient than multilateral mechanisms in terms of closeness and commitment. In many cases, regions are better able to deal with their own conflicts than a distant and sometimes paralysed UN. Moreover, regional organisations are often better than multilateral efforts at addressing conflict prevention as well as post-conflict reconstruction. The region has to live with the consequences of unresolved conflicts and cannot simply withdraw from the conflict. The EU in Bosnia is a case in point.

Clearly, multilateral and regional approaches can potentially be competing authority structures; hence the challenge is to construct arrangements in which the two logics complement one another. Insistence on the vertical UN-led approach, which seeks to subordinate regions, will only reinforce competition between the two logics. Likewise, an ideological regionalism that ignores wider multilateralism cannot address the links between conflicts within the region and wider global politics. Instead, complementarity can be encouraged through interregional arrangements that support the values and principles associated with the idea of multilateralism. The UN would still be needed, but it would be a rather different organisation compared to the present one expressing an outmoded Westphalian logic.

We are arguing for some kind of horizontal and more balanced combination of regional and multilateral agencies, each having its own basis of authority, as the predominant future form of global security governance. Both the UN and regional bodies need each other and must assume shared responsibility for resolving security problems. For its part, the UN has suffered a decline in power and authority and therefore needs support from regional bodies. Meanwhile many regional formations are still embryonic and need support from global arrangements. A combined multilateral regional strategy provides the most feasible solution for the midterm future.

This principle of genuinely shared responsibility stands in contrast to the orthodox approach where the UN vertically delegates authority to and distributes mandates among regional bodies. It is hard to conceive how the
UN can maintain primacy if regionalism continues to deepen and strengthen around the world. A UN based on nation-states is not well suited to control strong regions. With increasing regional actorship, regions will to an increasing extent be able to manage their own conflicts. For example, consolidated security governance in Europe around the EU will reduce the relevance of the UN as regards European conflicts. Similarly, if African security regionalism consolidates in the future, it would be more appropriate that the UN be subordinated to African security mechanisms rather than vice versa.

The optimal form of peacekeeping combines the legitimacy of multilateral (UN) interventions and sanctions with the efficiency of regional and interregional interventions. Although they need to be relevant for their own specific types of security threats, there should be some kind of multilaterally acknowledged rules system in order to prevent abuses. The interlevel approach can be sequenced since multilateral operations take more time to organise than do regional operations. The interregional approach is needed in order to strengthen weakly organised regions such as the AU and facilitate legitimacy and recognition for the EU, for instance through working with ASEAN or the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation in various Asian crises.

Finally, it has to be remembered that a conflict is more than the acute violent stage. In a positive circle regional cooperation for development reduces the level of conflict and the peace dividend facilitates further development cooperation. This circle can also be turned into a vicious circle, where conflicts and underdevelopment feed on each other. Development regionalism is a way to break vicious circles, and contains an important preventive factor by which conflict-generating processes can be avoided before they occur. Development regionalism is also necessary in the post-conflict reconstruction phase. Sweden has by now gained experience from all the phases of the conflict circle and should be able to take the lead in developing a broad regional strategy for conflict management in line with the global development policy, and combining multilateral and regional instruments within an EU framework.


Det teoretiska ramverket har generell relevans för olika regionaliseringsprojekt i världen även om de komparativa möjligheterna inte betonas i denna rapport, som enbart behandlar den historiska framväxten av EU:s aktörsskap. Detta utgörs av tre samverkande komponenter: ”regionness” (som står för regional sammanhållning och identitet), ”presence” (som står för tyngden i den internationella närvaron – demografiskt, ekonomiskt, militärt etcetera), och ”actorness” (som står för en medvetet skapad handleingsförmåga gentemot omgivningen). Dessa komponenter kan öka och minska i betydelse och de förändras också över tid, vilket gör regionalt aktörsskap till en sammansatt och komplex variabel, som vi dock menar är viktig att förstå för att kunna bedöma EU:s styrka och svaghet som global aktör, liksom karaktären av dess relationer till andra regioner.
Den europeiska identitetens utveckling beskrivs historiskt genom olika grader av ”regionness”: från en prewestfalisk, diffus mångnivåstruktur, som motsvarar den medeltida feodala ordningen, över den moderna westfaliska ordningen av nationalstater och mellanstatligt system, till den postwestfaliska, postmoderna, ”neofeodala” ordning som kan skönjas idag. Det är i denna framväxande nya ordning, ”det globaliserade tillståndet”, med flera samverkande beslutsnivåer som EU:s unika politiska erfarenheter som ”regional institutionalised polity” (regional institutionaliserad politisk enhet) kan spela en betydande roll.

Problemet när det gäller effektiviteten i EU:s aktörsskap är enligt rapporten det komplexa maskineri för utrikespolitiskt beslutsfattande och agerande som utgör det icke avsedda resultatet av EU:s snåriga tillblivelseprocess, och den därav ambivalenta hållningen mellan överstatlighet och mellanstatlighet, mellan olika institutionella aktörer (konsistensproblemet) samt mellan olika politikområden (samstämmighetsproblemet).

Politikerna implementeras dessutom i skilda politiska miljöer med olika typer av problem och utmaningar: utvidgningspolitiken gentemot kandidatländer, stabiliseringspolitiken i det europeiska närområdet (neighbourhood), bilateral relationer till olika stormakter (ibland kallade ”strategiska” relationer), samt interregionala band till Latinamerika, Afrika och Asien. Det är särskilt fenomenet ”interregionalism” som tillдрvar sig vårt intresse i denna rapport. Man kan säga att interregionalism (dvs. skapandet av fasta institutionella relationer mellan regionala aktörer) är ett huvudsår i EU:s utrikespolitik. Interregionalism förutsätter en viss nivå av regionalt aktörsskap från båda sidor. Ytterst syftar denna externa politik till en fredlig, rättvis och folkrättsligt legal världsordning, som kan beskrivas som ”regional multilateralism”.

Trots växande globala utmaningar har effektiviteten i det europeiska aktörsskapet avtagit som en konsekvens av obalansen mellan de båda processerna utvidgning och fördjupning. Detta har påverkat såväl den europeiska identiteten som handlingsförmågan. Ansvaret för att vända denna tendens och att rationalisera och effektivisera det utrikespolitiska komplexet vilar nu tungt på medlemsstaterna, som emellertid fortfarande i stor utsträckning agerar utifrån en westfalisk (dvs. nationalstatlig) politisk logik. Många stater saknar ett europeiskt perspektiv på världsproblemen och nöjer sig med att ställa frågan vad EU kan göra för dem.

I själva verket visar europaforskningen att ett partiellt uppgivande av den egna suveräniteten till förmån för ett övernationellt agerande är en förutsättning för att uppnå nationell handlingsförmåga i en gränslös värld som
hotas av fattigdom, konflikter, terrorism och miljöförstöring. Det föreligger således ingen motsättning mellan nationellt och övernationellt aktörsskap när det gäller frågan om global utveckling.


När det gäller de tre politikområden som rapporten uppmärksammat och som utgör centrala komponenter i en politik för global utveckling är policyimplikationen att en global utvecklingspolitik på regional och interregional nivå har störst förutsättningar att bli framgångsrik.


Vad avser *internationellt utvecklingssamarbete* är det uppenbart att den gamla formen av bilateralt bistånd mellan stater är överspelad i en global värld, och att en rationalisering måste ske på en övernationell, gärna då regional, basis. En multilateralisering är ingen lösning eftersom man då i stor utsträckning avhänder sig kontroll, liksom möjligheten att garantera

När det till sist gäller säkerhetsområdet ses säkerhet och utveckling idag alltmer som två sidor av samma mynt. Eftersom lokala konflikter regelmässigt regionaliseras, det vill säga ”spiller över” på grannstater, är en regional konflikthantering oundgänglig, även om denna kan behöva multilateral sanktionering inom ramen för FN. Återigen handlar det således om en bättre balans mellan regionalism och multilateralism. Vidare är det viktigt att understryka att konflikthantering är så mycket mer än fredsframställande åtgärder i en akut, våldsam konflikt. En konflikt grundar sig ofta i djupt rotade ekonomiska, sociala och politiska problem som kan åtgärdas genom utvecklingssamarbete, och om en våldsam konflikt ändå äger rum innebör försonings- och återuppbysingsprocessen långvarigt arbete som, återigen genom utvecklingssamarbete, måste elimineras de ursprungliga konfliktorsakerna. På få andra områden är samstämmighetsprincipen lika viktig. Sverige har erfarenhet av olika åtgärder inom de olika konfliktfaserna, från konfliktförebyggande och fredsdiplomati, över konflikthantering, till återuppbyggnadsverksamhet, och borde ha åtskilliga erfarenheter att dela med sig på området regional konflikthantering. Betonas bör att en sådan inte utesluter någon form av involvering från FN:s sida, vilket är viktigt inte minst ur legitimitetssynpunkt. Som etablerad vän av FN borde Sverige med framgång kunna bidra till en förening av det ”globala” och det ”regionala” till en väl avvägd regional multilateralism.
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